KOREA FOCUS

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SOUTH KOREA:
U.S.–JAPANESE COLONY

Vol. II, No. 1 Jan.-Feb. 1973

KOREA FOCUS

We of AKFIC greet with rejoicing, thanksgiving, and hope the great victory of anti-imperialist forces over the U.S. aggression in Indochina. We rejoice because the unspeakably barbarous, racist, genocidal destruction of Vietnamese life and property by the U.S. has ended and U.S. imperialism in this part of Indochina has been beaten back. We thank the steadfastly heroic Vietnamese people, who have endured for three decades and have shed untold quantities of blood to secure their right of self-determination. We thank also the millions of peace-loving workers and peoples of the world, the movements of national liberation, the governmental bodies, who lent their military, economic, political, and moral support to the just struggle of the Vietnamese people. Let it be noted that the socialist sector of the world was in the forefront of this anti-imperialist struggle, especially the Soviet Union without whose assistance victory would have been impossible.

Our prime hope at this moment is that U.S. imperialist forces will be removed from Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and the waters around Indochina—and that victory over imperialism will be extended to the land and people of Korea. It must never be forgotten that in 1950-1953 the Korean people frustrated a similar effort of U.S. imperialism to enslave a small Asian nation moving toward unity and socialism. Korea, however, remains to this day divided and a truce agreement there has never been concluded in spite of present negotiations of both sides to achieve unity. The major obstruction to progress toward that unity is the presence of alien U.S. imperialist troops in South Korea.

We believe that millions of American peace-loving people, who played a role in securing peace in Vietnam, will continue to fight against the pressure of imperialist arms in all of Asia, especially Korea. We call upon them to engage with us in the struggle to remove U.S. troops from Korea and leave Korea to the Korean people as Vietnam is now being left to the Vietnamese people.

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Art work by Robert Lassen

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SOUTH KOREA

the 'Kingdom of Poverty'

—A historical sketch

On September 8, 1945, shortly after Japan's rule came to an end, a popular front government, the Korean People's Republic, replaced the Japanese authorities, set up a capital at Seoul and exercised political authority over all Korea. It was headed by a non-Communist newspaper editor, Lyuh Woon Hyun, who sought to establish cordial ralations with the American occupation army in the belief that the United States authorities would acknowledge his government's popularity throughout Korea.

The United States command rebuffed Lyuh's efforts, replaced his administrators with Japanese, and suppressed his administration entirely in December 1945. As part of this maneuver, Syngman Rhee was brought back to Korea from his exile in Washington, and put forward as the American-approved leader. Washington proceeded to fashion a government in South Korea of hated political and economic business hustlers who simply switched from serving the Japanese to serving the U.S.A.

Following the 1950-'53 war of aggression initiated by the Rhee clique, increased American military aid and economic investment enabled Syngman Rhee to maintain power in an administration marked by repression, terror, electoral fraud, bribery and corruption. But by 1960, popular unrest had reached such proportions—climaxed by the student uprisings—that Washington was forced to dispose of Rhee in March 1960 as a liability. An unstated reason, in addition, was Rhee's stubborn refusal to the return of Japanese capital, a condition which was becoming a vital part of developing United States policy in Asia.

Rhee was succeeded as head of the South Korean government by John M. Chang, a vacillating man of the middle, friendly to the United States, but aware of the intense reaction in the country to years of repression, and the desire for unification with the North. Demonstrations for unification were an almost daily occurrence, and a student march was scheduled to culminate in a meeting with North Korean students on May 19, 1961, in Panmunjom. The day before the meeting, a military coup toppled Chang, under the pretext that his policies were leading to a Communist takeover of the government. General Park Chung Hee emerged as the "strong man" leader.

The Park regime has, if anything, been even more repressive than that of Syngman Rhee. A vast network of spies and informers, under the direction of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, infests the country. Children are paid for bringing protest leaflets to police stations. Thousands have been imprisoned under the 1961 Anti-Communist Act, and executions have been frequent. Peasants are rounded up in anti-guerilla campaigns, and the student movement is dealt with ruthlessly. In short, South Korea is a police state government that depends on the support and approval of the United States government for its existence.

—The Editors

CAPITALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

By DR. GERHARD BREIDENSTEIN

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INTRODUCTION

This article has two purposes. For those who are interested in Korea or specialize in Korean studies it attempts to present an overall interpretation of the economic, social and political situation in South Korea, focusing on the term "capitalism." For such readers the analytic framework of this essay may be of more interest than the factual information. Although not all aspects of the present South Korean society can be related to the concept of capitalism, this analysis seeks to show that this society cannot be fully understood without regard to this term and its critical implications. The concept of capitalism used in this paper will emerge through the article itself, certainly in its concluding part.

For those readers who are interested in capitalism as an analytic term and are familiar with its theoretical implications (though perhaps from a more general political science point of view) this essay intends to present a case-study of capitalism in one particular developing country, using illustrations also from areas usually neglected in theories about capitalism. For such readers, the theoretical aspects of this article will not be new, but the illustrations may interest them.

Accordingly, this study tries to maintain a qualitative balance between concrete description and analytic theory, but it does not pretend to remain neutral between positive and negative judgments emerging from the analysis. Three years of living and social involvement in South Korea do not allow the author to be uncommitted. But during the same three years there has been much discussion in the academic world of Western Europe and North America that a social scientist may be committed, in fact cannot be uncommitted. The social reality of this article is not "neutral" with regard to the concepts of justice, freedom and human dignity. Would, then, a "well-balanced," "value-free" description be "objective"?

An overall interpretation of South Korea demands discussion of a broad scale of problems. Within the scope of this article, only a sketchy outline can be attempted.

I. ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

1. GNP-Growth

The most frequently quoted economic data on South Korea are the impressive, almost unbelievable, growth rates of the Gross National Product over the last ten, particularly the last five, years: 1966: 13.4%; 1967: 8.9%; 1968: 13.3%; 1969: 15.9%; 1970: 9.7%; 1971: 10.2%; 1962-1971 average: 10%[1*]. The per capita income, which takes the population growth into consideration, also increased remarkably: 1966: US $131; 1971: US $253. These figures may be exaggerated to support the Republic of Korea success story ("Miracle of the River Han"); the official inflation rates considered in these growth data are probably too low. But these figures cannot be pure fantasy. International creditors watch the Korean economy carefully and cannot be deceived completely. There is no doubt that the South Korean economy did expand rapidly, making South Korea one of the most successful developing countries—if high GNP growth is taken as a criterion for development success. This usually accepted presupposition does need serious ques-

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* *Footnotes will be found at conclusion of article.*

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tioning, however, as does the price paid for this growth and the social consequences resulting from it. Such questions will be raised in this article. At this point we will examine how and where this remarkable economic growth occurred.

2. Sectoral Development and Investments

The growth rates in industrial sectors demonstrate what is called an unbalanced development: average GNP growth for the years 1962-69 was 9.9%. In the same period agriculture and fishery grew by an annual average of 4.3%, mining and manufacturing by 17.9%, and social overhead and services by 11.4%.

Thus the industrial structure, i.e. the main sectors contributing to GNP, changed drastically: in 1962 agriculture had a 39.7% share in GNP, in 1969 only 28.4%, while the manufacturing industry grew from 15.0% in 1962 to 24.6% in 1969. Of course, this shift from agricultural to manufacturing production, is a necessary step in the process of modernization. The setting up of new and basic industries, such as fertilizer plants, oil refineries, cement factories and power plants, which were successfully established in South Korea during the First and Second Five Year Economic Development Plans (1962-66 and 1967-71), as well as infrastructure investments in roads, railways, water and electricity supply, communication etc., are inevitable conditions of development in any economic system. However, the speed and the mode of this change in the industrial structure of a country can be very different, and their social implications, too. In South Korea, as in many other developing countries, the undue neglect of agriculture led to rural poverty, mass migration to the cities, and growth of urban slums. Whether this is a typical phenomenon of a capitalist economic system will be discussed later.

Another significant phenomenon of South Korea's economic development is the rapid expansion of consumption and service industries, such as textile and clothing, electronics, cars, pharmaceuticals, plastic utensils, banking, insurance, transportation, and tourism. Such industries may not rank in the top priority of a development theory, but for private investors they are certainly more interesting than investment in agriculture, education, or health care.

Finally, there is a striking imbalance in the geographical distribution of economic development. In 1969, 80% of all new firms were established in Seoul. Aside from the Seoul-Incheon-Suweon area, there is only one area of major industrial investment: the cities of Masan, Busan and Ulsan on the southeast coast. This has an obvious political explanation: President Park's home province, where he has his strongest electoral support, is in the southeast. But there is an additional strong economic reason: private investment in rural areas is not profitable, in spite of tax favors offered by the government for such investments. The infrastructure is not sufficiently developed, and the supply of cheap labor in a rural area is not as unlimited as in urban slums.

This leads to the question: Who in South Korea directs investments with regard to geographical and sectoral distribution? About 20%, recently 25%, of domestic capital formation occurred through government investment or in government enterprises, about 70% in private and other public enterprises—the remaining 10% being increases in stocks, or not specified.[2] Government investment goes mainly into social overhead and some key industries (fertilizer, oil, petrochemicals, iron and steel), while private investment goes where not too much capital is needed and profit comes more easily: middle and light industries (textile, electrical products, cars, pharmaceuticals, etc.).

The sources for financing these investments also must be analyzed. Only one half of the annual total investment came from domestic savings, the other half being financed by foreign capital.[3] National savings, to a larger extent (30-40% of the total), stem from private sources, with a smaller, but recently increasing, part coming from the government. Foreign capital (altogether more than U.S. $3,000 million by the end of 1970) came only to a small degree as foreign investments (7.5% or $225 million), the rest being loans. Direct foreign investment in South Korea is surprisingly low. Investment climate was not considered to be good, partly because of the military tensions on the peninsula. By the middle of 1971 U.S. investors accounted for 58% of all foreign investment, and Japanese for 31% (their share, however, rapidly increasing). Other major investors were Panama, West Germany, Hongkong, the Netherlands, Italy and Britain.[3a] After the ban on 100% Japanese ownership in South Korea was lifted, and after the opening of the Masan Free Trade Zone on the southeast coast,

Japanese investors became much more interested in Korea. On the other hand, big Japanese companies turned away from investment plans in South Korea as soon as Chou En-lai declared the Four Principles of Trade with Japan, one of which discriminates against firms investing in South Korea.

But in addition to direct investment, license and supply contracts as well as loans are other forms of economic dominance. Thus, the fear of Korean intellectuals and businessmen that Korea is again becoming Japan's economic colony seems to be well-grounded. Among the loans, the bigger and increasing share (end of 1970: 63.5% are commercial loans—so-called "hard loans"—and only 29% of all foreign capital came as public loans with "soft" conditions.[4] This high inflow of foreign capital causes a permanently high inflation (more than 10% annually, according to probably conservative government figures), and implies an increasing burden of debt servicing (U.S. $350 million estimated for 1971).[5] Since 71% of this consisted of loans or investments from private business, most of this capital went into the most profitable sector, the manufacturing industries.[5a] Only a part of the small share of public loans, much of which were used to purchase rice (see below), was used for infrastructure investments.

We can summarize at this point that the predominance of private domestic or foreign investment (70-80% of total investments) leads to a one-sided expansion of secondary industries, because this is the type of investment where one can profit most from low wages and get a return of one's investment within a relatively short time. On the other hand, investments with no profit (infrastructure) or low profit (agriculture), or with high capital requirements (key industries), necessarily are neglected in a developing country where the bulk of all available capital is invested by private, profit-oriented investors.

Thus, in the cities of South Korea today one can buy almost everything a consumer can dream of (or advertisements make him dream of), and urban middle class people spend all their money on clothes, shoes, handbags, neckties, electric appliances, beer, etc. At the same time, there are not enough schools, hospitals, public transportation, roads, drinking water, electricity, etc., particularly not in the rural areas, where one half of the population still lives. Obviously there is here a basic contradiction between the necessities of development and the inner tendencies of capitalism.

3. Foreign Trade

Another contradictory phenomenon of the South Korean economic system is its foreign trade. South Korea, unlike most other developing countries, including North Korea, is poor in raw materials. Some of the raw materials basic for industrialization, such as iron and steel, good coal, and petroleum, Korea needs to *import* (1969: approx. 12% of all imports). Further, she has, like most other developing countries, a tremendous need for importing capital goods (1969: approx. 36%). Finally, South Korea has a great and increasing need for importing agricultural goods, mainly wheat and rice (1969: approx. 17%).

Thus, in order to be able to pay for these necessary imports, South Korea had to develop her originally weak *exports*. This was achieved with striking quantitative success: in 1960 exports totaled only $33 million; but by 1968 they rose to $455 million, in 1969 to $622 million, and in 1970 to $835 million. Thus export expanded with annual growth rates of about 40%. These successes, however, were achieved mainly with manufactured goods for whose production raw materials first had to be imported. For example, plywood, the most important single export item (in 1969 12.9% of all exports), is made entirely from imported lumber. Textiles, clothes, shoes and wigs (47.5% of 1969 exports) are almost completely made from imported synthetic materials. Furthermore, to produce quality export, advanced machinery had to be imported. Thus, Korea's exports have a very low and decreasing foreign exchange earning rate (51.5% in 1970[6]) and are highly import inducing.[7] No wonder that, with rising exports, imports rose also (1968: $1,468 million, 1969: $1,823 million, 1970: $1,984 million), and the gap between imports and exports was closing exceedingly slowly (1970 imports were still more than double the exports). Considering further that Korea's manufactured exports (about 80% of all her commodity exports) are facing strong competition, particularly in their main market, the U.S. (which recently imposed special import restrictions), there are serious doubts that this is a reasonable policy. Finally, Korea's manufactured

goods are competitive only as long as Korean workers' wages remain extremely low.

An alternative strategy would be to emphasize export of raw and processed agriculture and fishery products such as fish, sea-weed, tobacco, ginseng, raw silk, fruits–items which have been relatively successful thus far, though not receiving any government support. They have a very high foreign exchange earning rate (100% and 88% respectively),[8] could directly benefit farmers and fishermen, and would stimulate decentralized small and medium-sized industry. Why is such export strategy, which has many economic and social advantages, not supported by the government? The answer: it is not in the interest of established private business. On the contrary: existing Korean and foreign manufacturing industries, facing a weak domestic market, are most interested in the government's continued strong support of exports in the form of tax and customs favors, preferential tariffs and loans amounting to government subsidies worth 17 cents per $1 exported.[9] It is easy to predict that this kind of export policy will soon encounter serious difficulties, both at home and abroad.

4. Agriculture

We have several times noted South Korea's weak agricultural policy. One of its most striking symptoms is the fact that Korea, a rice exporting country under Japanese colonial rule, now has to import great amounts of rice,[10] wheat and sugar. Self-sufficiency in food had been one of the main targets of the Second Five-Year Plan, but now even the Third Plan (1972-76) does not envisage full self-supply in grains. In fact, Korea's grain self-supply rate has dropped from 97% in 1965 to 81% in 1970.[11]

Another symptom is the widening gap between rural and urban income. Urban households increased their expenditures from 1963-68 by 63%, rural households over the same period by 8%.[12] This is a direct consequence of the too-low price of rice which is set and controlled by the government and which does not even meet the production costs.[13] The inadequate agricultural production has mainly structural reasons:

1. The farmland units are too small. The average size of land is 2.25 acres (0.9 hectare) per farm household, but one third of all farmers own less than 1.25 acre.

2. The size and shape of the fields are too small and irregular to accommodate farm machinery.

3. One fourth of the nation's rice paddies (at the end of 1969) required irrigation to ensure against drought.

4. Korea's farm economy is not sufficiently diversified. But to expand profitable cash-crop farming (vegetables, fruits, mushrooms, mulberry trees for sericulture etc.), Korean farmers would need assistance capital, instruction, and marketing. The same is true for livestock breeding and dairy farming. However, the loans available for the agriculture and fishery sector sharply decreased from 40% of all public loans in 1963 to 14% in 1969.[14]

The government has made some efforts to develop agriculture. Five modern fertilizer plants have been established which provide the full domestic supply. Pesticides and insecticides are now domestically available also. Land arrangement and land reclamation, as well as irrigation programs, have been instituted. But the figures given above and the fact that hundreds of thousands of farmers desert their land only to find themselves living in urban slums, indicate that these efforts have been far from satisfactory. When the government announced the Third Five Year Plan (1972-76) it was asserted that special emphasis would be given to the agriculture-fisheries sector. In fact, the plan figures for annual growth of the primary sector (4.5%) and the share of total investments allocated to this sector (11.8%) are higher than the performance figures of the Second Five Year Plan (3% and 9.7% respectively).[15] However, they are lower than the original plan figures of that Second Plan (5% and 16.3%) which had such a poor result.[16] Thus, the FAO stated that the planned growth rate of 4.5% for Korea's primary sector is much too low for a satisfactory development.[17]

The main obstacle to a drastic increase in agricultural productivity seems to be the deficient economic units in South Korea's agriculture. A plan has been prepared to lift the land ownership ceiling of 7.5 acres (3 hectares) which was established in the land reform of 1949.[18] This would allow urban businessmen to invest in profitable sectors of agriculture. But it would certainly ruin the vast majority of poor farmers. There is already 20% tenant farming, even though banned by the present law.[19] The only alternative to this capitalist approach would be to

Poverty-stricken "homes" of South Korean workers.

stimulate and support a genuine movement to form production co-operatives among farmers. It is more than doubtful that Park's regime will follow this socialist path, although it seems to be the only one capable of modernizing agriculture without driving most of the farmers from their fields into urban slums.

II. ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

1. Urbanization

Cities in South Korea are exploding. After Seoul, Kwangju, Taegu, Taejon, and Incheon are those with the fastest growth rate. Seoul, with an annual growth rate of 8% (2% natural increase, 6% immigration) is among the fastest growing cities in the world. It doubled within 10 years, i.e. from 2.5 million people in 1960 to 5.0 million in 1970. In 1972 Seoul's population will surpass 6 million. This means that about 1,000 newcomers stream into an already overcrowded city daily! Even the most effective city administration could not keep pace with such an influx and provide proper housing, employment, transportation, schools, water, electricity, and garbage collection. Thus, Seoul is becoming more and more chaotic.

Most obvious in daily life is the *transportation problem.* In spite of the city's great efforts to expand streets and build elevated highways, streets are overcrowded with taxis, private cars and buses, the only means of mass transportation. Here we note a typical capitalistic feature of social life in South Korea. While the nation's total number of cars doubled from 50,000 in 1966 to 109,000 in 1969, the number of Seoul's

cars jumped from 20,000 to 50,000. During the same three years the number of private cars in Seoul tripled from 8,000 to 24,000.[20] In 1971 private cars for privileged people represented 60% of all cars in Seoul. Why was this tolerated while 80% of the people (or more) depend on buses which are packed closer than chicken-coops?[21] There is only one convincing answer: three foreign-car producers (Toyota, Ford, and Fiat) are competing on the Korean market to sell locally-assembled cars, and the Seoul city government did not want or could not afford to hurt their interests by refusing licenses for private cars.[22] That of course would have been a reasonable policy if one considers that two cars, usually only transporting two persons, take as much space as one bus which serves 30 persons. Another irrational but typically capitalist phenomenon is that about 200 small bus companies are competing for passengers in the down-town area of Seoul, while the outskirts are neglected. It is in these private owner's interest that buses are overcrowded and poorly maintained.

In a similar way there is a basic conflict between the interests of the people and those of private entrepreneurs in the fantastic problems of *air and water pollution.* Paradoxically, they are worse in this underdeveloped country than in highly industrialized nations.[23] A U.S. pollution expert called the northern Han River, which serves as the main drinking-water source for Seoul, worse than New York's sewage.[24] Seoul and other cities in South Korea do not have any human-waste treatment facilities and no sewage system. Air and water pollution is caused by an unchecked disposal of untreated industrial waste and smoke, but 80% of Seoul's air pollution is ascribed to exhaust from cars, a consequence of the poor quality of gasoline and diesel oil, as well as of old and poorly maintained engines. All this is not a matter of technical know-how or of being a poor or a rich country, but whether the government is willing to force car owners and companies to install anti-pollution devices. Of course, such costs would reduce the profits.

Such *housing* is another tremendous problem facing South Korea's cities because of rural-urban migration. In 1970 there were only 600,000 houses for the one million households in Seoul, and 180,000 of them were illegal. It was then estimated by the city administration that in the slum areas an average of three households, comprising 12-15 people, occupy each little house. According to this estimate, 2.5-million people—that is, one half of Seoul's population at that time—were living as squatters. Some of these illegal houses are solid and have been permanent for 10 to 20 years. But more than half of them are wooden shacks or even tents.[25] Houses in slums have no drinking water supply, no sewage, often no electricity, no garbage collection, and their inhabitants depend on a few public toilets. Experts say that other Asian slums are much worse than Korea's. But it should be considered that winter in Korea is extremely severe.

Seoul's city administration made two major attempts to clear away slums. In 1968/69 400 apartment buildings with 16,000 housing units were built within a short time on the city-owned steep hillsides formerly covered with slums. But despite cheap construction people still had to pay about $1,000 to move in. Therefore, many sold their priority tickets or the flat after having fixed it up. Today less than 60% of the occupants are former slum dwellers. The city had to stop the huge program after one apartment building collapsed, killing 33 people. Most of the other 400 apartment blocks were found in need of repair and reinforcement; some of them even had to be demolished, because of slipshod construction and large-scale embezzlement of funds.

The city administration then began to remove tens of thousands of slum dwellers to Kwangju, a new town two bus-hours southeast of Seoul. Those who had owned their little shack—half of the families had to pay a rent even for a hut[26]—were given a small piece of land and a tent for four families—but no jobs, no houses, no transportation to Seoul. The situation in this new slum city got so bad that in August 1971 the people there rose up, and 1,000 riot policemen had to be mobilized to disperse the demonstrations. Land speculation by small brokers and big financiers, another capitalist feature fully utilized in South Korea, also contributed to frustrate this "solution." An estimated 60% of the people sold their piece of land and moved back to Seoul—into another slum.

To build enough apartments is apparently beyond the city's financial power. To remove slums from the inner city to other places is certainly no solution either. There is *no* solution to slums once they exist. So, one has to ask for the causes:

where do the slum dwellers come from and why do they come?

Reliable and comprehensive data are not yet available, but some lesser surveys (compare footnote 25) suggest that aside from some small groups of war refugees, most squatters come from rural areas, either directly to Seoul or via provincial cities. Their motivations are certainly varied, and are composed of a number of "pushing" and "pulling" factors. But it is generally assumed that urban immigrants are either young people who see no economic opportunity in their rural homes, or whole families who do not possess enough land to sustain themselves and are attracted by a rather vague but glamorous image of the city which allegedly provides all kinds of opportunities for everybody. Government propaganda supports this image. Thus the urban problems are closely interrelated with the rural problems.

This brings us back to our earlier criticism that the South Korean government has failed to develop agriculture. To our previous explanation that this is due to the fact that private investors are not interested in agriculture, we add the strong suspicion that the uncontrolled rural-urban migration is in fact welcomed by the government, since it provides unlimited reserves of people who are willing to work for any wage. (32% of the household heads in Seoul's slums are unemployed or with no regular job.[27]) Since the government's "export first" policy and its attempts to attract foreign investors depend on a continuous low wage level, it is logical not to do anything to prevent poor farmers from coming to the cities.

2. Grass-Root Life and Class-Structure

How are these people who came to the city, full of hope, making their living? A few typical examples illustrate what life is like at the bottom of a capitalist system in a developing country.

If the father of a family is strong enough, he will borrow an A-frame (a wooden structure to carry loads on the back) and try to get occasional work. If he gets an order, he will have to work hard and earn maybe 25 cents an hour. His wife has got a job she can do at home so she can watch the baby. She cracks nuts, 12 hours for 50 cents. The oldest son knows a dealer from whom he can borrow a bundle of neckties to sell on the street. But from the dollar he might be able to make during the day he has to pay a daily interest of 5% on the goods he borrowed for his little "shop." The daughter is lucky to have a "permanent" job in a small garment workshop. But she has to work 12 to 15 hours every day, has no day off in a month, and gets only 10 dollars per month. Thus, the family is making a daily income of maybe two dollars.[28] This is just enough to get simple food every day (20 to 30 cents for one bowl of rice or noodle-soup) and pay the rent for the one room in a shack which is owned by a fish-dealer.

A single girl from the countryside comes to Seoul. She finds work as a housemaid, first in a middle-class family, later in a small inn. In both cases she gets no pay, only free room and board for a 15-hour day. When she can stand it no longer she runs away. After days of hunger she finds a private "employment center" which promises her a good-paying job in a beer hall. After a few days of work she is forced to be a prostitute. Because of her debts to the center they will not let her go. A policeman to whom she tries to tell her story is paid-off by the brothel owner.

This is exploitation at grass-roots level. These examples show the dehumanizing effects of the principle of profit which—in development theories—stimulates people for economic activities and which—in reality—drives people, even on the lowest levels, to squeeze those who are one step lower.

Poverty as such does not stir people who do not know any other life. But poverty frustrates the poor if, right next to them, there are quite a number of people—the urban middle class—wasting money on fashionable clothes, in restaurants and beer halls, and a small number of people—the upper class, consisting of businessmen, politicians and military leaders—leading a provocatively luxurious life and accumulating the invisible wealth of the nation. There is not only a gap between rural and urban living, but an even bigger gap within the urban society.

Here, we have to consider more deeply the *class-structure* emerging in a capitalist developing country like South Korea. "Class," in the sense Karl Marx applied this term, means more than a group of people on the same income stratum. (That is the degenerated meaning of "class" in functional sociology, as used above.)

It stands for a group of people who are in the same social-economic situation. The class of capitalists is characterized by their power to dispose of profits and job (no matter how low their personal income may be), while the class of workers (no matter how high their income is) is classified by their dependency on place of work owned by others and their lack of influence over the disposal of the wealth they helped to create. A similar class distinction can be made with regard to landlords and tenant farmers.

It is one of the characteristics of capitalist industrialization that it creates the new class of industrial workers. Unlike the farmer or the craftsman, and more than the feudal farmworker, the industrial worker's total life situation depends on having or not having a job. Being unemployed in an urban slum exposes a man and his family to extreme physical and psychological hardships. If we further consider that, in a capitalist developing country, being temporarily sick, being disobedient to the employer, working for a labor union, or passing the age of 40, are reasons for losing one's job, then we may understand that belonging to the working class implies more than having a low income. Likewise, belonging to the class of capitalists means more than having a relatively high or very high personal income. The capitalists have economic and political power over the workers, individually and as a class.

The employee in an office, in a shop, or in other service industries is basically in the same situation of dependency as the industrial worker. The fact that he or she usually has a higher income and better working conditions than a laborer may conceal, but does not change the situation. But since employees usually are better off materially ("middle class") they can more easily be corrupted and integrated into the system.

Speaking in quantitative terms, South Korea's class structure is roughly like this: of the 10 million economically active population, 5 million are working in agriculture and fishery (mainly as self-employed and family workers), 1 million in mining and manufacturing industries (mainly as laborers), 2 million in tertiary industries (mainly as employees) while 2 million are self-employed or family workers in the non-agricultural sectors.[28a]

3. The Education System

Education in South Korea is theoretically free for six years of compulsory education. In reality there are "school support fees" and other irregular expenses, but it is probably fair to say that there are no families who could not cover such expenses. But from middle school on through high school up to university, education is getting more and more expensive.

All monthly expenses for a child in a public middle or high school amount to roughly U.S. $20; in a good private school parents have to pay around $30. Common private tutoring for a high school student to enable him to pass difficult university entrance exams will cost his parents $30-$50 a month. Enrollment in one of the numerous private universities costs $200 to $300, and every new term $250, not counting the student's monthly living costs. Government schools are less expensive, but only Seoul National University, with the country's most difficult entrance examination, has a "name-value."

If we recall that the average farm household in 1969 had a monthly income of roughly $75 and the urban wage earner household $90,[29] of which at least one half must be spent on food, then it becomes clear that higher education is out of reach for children of the vast majority of the South Korean population.

The fact that higher education in South Korea is something one must buy from institutions who are selling it (and often are making a good profit from this business) is one of the factors which separates classes. While a child's education depends on his father's income, it is the child's education which in turn determines his future income and his children's education. Thus, the low income people get a low education and, accordingly, only low-earning jobs. But children from the middle and upper classes get a high education which allows them to get well-paid and influential jobs. Only very few and exceptionally intelligent children are able to break out of this circle by getting one of the very rare scholarships. They do not invalidate the general rule that in South Korea higher education costs private money and therefore is inaccessible for whole classes of people. This is one of the grave social aspects of capitalism which is built on the ideological principle that you have to pay for whatever you want to get.

4. The Health Care System

We observe structurally the same problem in the field of medical care. Like education, medical care in South Korea costs private money, and one has to "buy" it from private doctors or hospitals. Doctors are known to make a lot of money from their health enterprises.

Most American or South Korean readers will find this "natural," but in fact this is another "unnatural" feature of a capitalist society. The consequences include the following. In July 1970 almost one half of South Korea's townships (myon=a low administrative unit) were without a qualified doctor, the same situation as four years earlier.[30] These areas are without a doctor not because of a general lack of doctors in Korea, but because of a lack of purchasing power in the villages. No private doctor can make his living in a rural area since the farmers cannot afford to pay for his expensive services. The same is true of the poor people in the cities who see the fancy clinics and hospitals, massed together in Seoul and Busan,[31] only from the outside. Fifty to 60% of the rural as well as the urban population consult only the pharmacist or the drug-store-keeper whenever they are sick.[32] So, there are not only doctorless rural areas, but also doctorless classes within the cities which, according to the statistics, are so well supplied with doctors.[33]

This is not a symptom of South Korea's underdevelopment, since there are a good number of physicians, and thousands have been allowed to go abroad.[34] Rather, this is to say, again, a consequence of the capitalist type of health care. In this system, doctors, who invested a lot of private money in long and too-specialized training, go where the money is: to the urban middle and upper classes, or abroad. Not these physicians, but the system should be blamed.

Two more consequences are related to the fact that in a capitalist society health care is a product sold on the market. The doctor-patient relationship is basically disturbed by distrust. The patient may be afraid that the doctor is trying to sell him a treatment he does not really need, while the doctor, against the best intention and professional ethics, is tempted to prescribe treatments which make his expensive clinic more profitable. The same is true of the pharmacist who is a businessman—not to mention the profit-interested pharmaceutical industry and its

Kim Yung Rim, a beggar at the age of 5 is the youngest of four fatherless children.

advertising efforts. (At least three big foreign pharmaceutical concerns are flooding the Korean market, which is not regulated, with medicines produced in Korea: Pfizer, Hoechst, and Bayer.)

The third grave consequence is a severe neglect of public health and preventive medicine. Hospitals and young physicians choosing their special fields are not interested in these most important branches of all medicine. A hospital which is expected at least to cover its costs cannot afford to run a public health or preventive medicine program for which nobody pays. And how can one expect a young, able doctor to go into one of the government's public health centers (where he gets $130 a month) as long as the society allows the rest of his colleagues to earn several times more as private practitioners?

The South Korean government has established health centers, one in each gun or gu (administrative unit below the province). But in March 1971, of the 1,220 positions for doctors, 370 were vacant.[35] Also, the sub-health centers, supposedly one in each myon, are very short of medical personnel. About 90% of their health workers (there are supposed to be one TB, one family-planning, and one mother-and-child-care worker in each) are hired on a temporary basis, unqualified or not doing medical work.[35] A survey revealed that very few people visit the health centers although they charge only a very low fee, because of bureaucratic procedures and rude treatment (doctors' motivation).[36]

Finally, the capitalist ideology that everybody is to be responsible for himself is contrary to the idea that medical service should be available to all who need it. As long as one's health care is connected with one's private financial situation, opportunities to become cured will be as unequally distributed as income. Only a national health care system, where everybody pays dues according to his financial ability but gets any medical service he needs free of charge, and where doctors are employed by the communities just as teachers—only such a system is able to distribute health care equally to all classes and areas and meet the medical needs of the country, whether they are profitable or not. Other developing countries which are poorer than South Korea, but have different priorities, have adopted such a socialist system (e.g. Ceylon, Tanzania, North Korea, to name but a few).

III. ASPECTS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

What kind of a political system supports this economic and social system?

1. The President

The Republic of Korea has a presidential constitution. There is a prime minister and a cabinet, but they are nominated by the president and have little more than administrative power. Policy decisions, from the big issues of foreign policy down to details such as where a new super-highway should run, are made in the Blue House, the presidential palace. This resembles the U.S. American concentration of power, but there is, one important difference: in the reality of South Korea's political life, the parliament has no checking power. This is for two reasons: first, elections are not free or fair enough to give any opposition party a chance to win a majority against the president (see below); second, the president, not by the constitution, of course, but by practice of over 20 years, is at the same time president of the ruling party. As such, he has the exclusive and final power to nominate his party's candidates or even exclude assemblymen from the party. This means that all representatives belonging to the government party depend solely on the president's good will if they want to retain or regain a lucrative parliamentary seat. This makes inner-party opposition, hence parliamentary opposition, against the president almost impossible.[37]

The constitution had a provision (article 39, 3) which allowed a president to be reelected only once. But President Park, already in his second term (1967-1971), planned and pushed through a revision which allows "three consecutive terms." The word "consecutive" was added at the last minute, October 17, 1972, giving room to the speculation that Park Chung-hee would continue his one-man-rule even beyond his third term after a short interregnum of a puppet. The same constitutional amendment, which was passed under highly illegal circumstances,[38] increased the majority for impeachment of the president from one-half to two-thirds of the members of parliament (article 61, 2).

In April 1971 Park Chung-hee was reelected through unfair and manipulated elections (see below), and he seemed to be the unchallenged and omnipotent ruler of South Korea. Yet, since there was social unrest, public criticism, in-

creasing economic problems, and perhaps even a threat of a right-wing military coup, Park declared on December 6, a State of Emergency, although there was no open crisis. As "reason" for this action Park quoted, in addition to the unspecified "threat from the North," international developments "including China's entrance into the UN." On December 27, his ruling party "passed" in a secret session a special bill which gave the president the following rights: to ban public assemblies and demonstrations (which were prohibited anyway); to control "irresponsible debates" in the mass media (which were consored anyway); to freeze wages, rents and prices; to interfere in labor disputes, and to mobilize any material or human resources for national purposes. Thus, President Park entered the year 1972 as a dictator unhampered by any democratic controls.

"Nevertheless, in October 1972, President Park launched another coup d'etat by declaring Martial Law (again without any visible crisis as reason), banning all political parties and activities, and suspending the constitution. A new constitution which he proclaimed soon after "legalizes" the unrestricted total power of the president and eliminates even the formal relicts of the parliament's controlling power. As far as this constitution is concerned Park Chung Hee can easily remain in office for the rest of his life."

2. Parliament, Parties, Elections

The powerlessness of the *parliament* is clear. It has been downgraded to a national public notary, passing bundles of laws without discussion. The chairmen of all committees belong to the government party, and the Speaker, of course, too. The opposition party, now holding 89 out of the 204 seats in the National Assembly, has not much more power than to demand interrogation of cabinet members.

The *Democratic Republican Party* (DRP), the government party, is a well organized machine with mass membership down to grass-root levels. Kim Jong-pil, the mastermind of the 1960 military coup, had organized the party soon after the coup. At election time members are mobilized all over the country to work as neighborhood campaign aides. Of course, for a government party it is easy to "pay" for such activities in one form or another. After elimination of the Kim Jong-pil faction, the party appears as a monolithic bloc bound to Park Chung-hee's wishes.

The main opposition party is the *New Democratic Party* (NDP), a split-off from the 1960 ruling Democratic Party. It is a loose organization of professional politicians, fighting each other, without mass membership. The party has no political program of its own. Besides criticizing the government in domestic affairs, it often reacts in more conservative and more anti-communist fashion than the DRP. Its presidential candidate in the 1971 race, Kim Dae-jung, a very able, young politician, who won his party's nomination in a uniquely democratic procedure against the party leadership, had tried during his successful campaign to formulate an alternative policy to the government, including some more progressive measures of a social-democratic nature. But he failed to gain his own party's support. When the NDP's president had to resign after having sold his constituency to the DRP, Kim Dae-jung was not elected the party's new president. Old hands, engaged in heated factional struggles without any political meaning, won against him.

There are two *splinter parties* each with one seat in the Assembly. A number of other parties also are tolerated. But only one of them, the United Socialist Party, has a political program to offer, and is not allowed to gain support. When its president, Kim Chul, in a press conference in August 1971, suggested a moderate policy of coexistence with North Korea, he was arrested and accused of having violated the Anti-Communism Law.

Elections in South Korea have always been heavily rigged. In 1960 and in 1967 so many and such grave irregularities came to light that violent student protests occurred which, in 1960, finally led to Syngman Rhee's downfall. In the 1971 elections, for the first time in Korea's history, several thousand students and a few dozen clergymen went to the provinces as election observers. There were many stories of such crude tactics as ballot-stuffing, electricity black-out during vote-counting, mauling of opposition observers, etc., but few were reported. This says more about the quality of the election manipulations than the quality of the elections themselves. Methods have become more refined. E.g., voters' lists are prepared by the Home Ministry, not by

an independent election management committee, and exclude NDP sympathizers while including DRP-voters several times.[39] The Election Management Committee does not include any representatives of the opposition party. Police, local administrators, and the government broadcasting system are not neutral, but strongly pro-government. The secret service discourages potential NDP supporters from contributing or joining, while "encouraging" support for the government party. The author, from his own observations of both the presidential and the general elections in April and May 1971, cannot recognize them as the free, democratic elections they pretended to be.

3. The Military and the Secret Service

Military leaders have played a significant role in South Korea since a group of young army officers took power in the coup of May, 1961. Park Chung-hee, himself an army general, used to surround himself with military comrades, even after he became a civilian president in the 1963 "elections." But now, as the economic and administrative machinery is getting more and more complicated, Park seems to prefer experts, and he sometimes appoints professors to important advisory or government posts. A group of professional politicians is now his favorite reservoir rather than the military leaders, who today seem to be more restricted to their jobs.

And this job is big enough. Compulsory military drill begins in high school and is continued with two (at times three or four) hours weekly in the universities. It is carried out on the campuses by active-duty officers and consists of lectures, formal drill, and exercise with small arms. Military service is three years, so that the ROK army, with 600,000 men, is one of the biggest armies in the world. After having finished military service, every man becomes a member of the Homeland Reserve Force, a 2.5-million man militia. In the biweekly training hours (the units are organized within schools, big companies, or villages) military officers make sure that nobody forgets who the enemy is.

Since the middle of 1971 the political role of the military, still one of the strongest supports of Park's regime, is no longer so clear as it used to be. The mutiny of a special air-force unit in August 1971 and Japanese news reports nourished speculations that Park, on December 6, declared the State of Emergency to prevent a military coup.

"There are indications that this again was the true reason behind Park's actions in October 1972. The military's reaction to the North-South detente is an open question in the South Korean scene."

There are three *secret services* operating independently in South Korea. Compared with the Counter Espionage Operations Headquarters and the Army Security Command, the Central Intelligence Agency (Korean CIA) is the strongest and politically most influential. It is no exaggeration to say that the CIA fully controls the political parties (including the government party), all major organizations (including the labor unions), the mass media (there is an official representative of the CIA in each newspaper office), and the campuses (student chairman elections are financially manipulated by the CIA, informants are everywhere among students). The omnipresence of the CIA can be experienced by anyone living in South Korea if he is somehow involved with socially relevant organizations. That the CIA grew politically powerful—maybe too powerful—became evident when President Park dismissed the influential director of the CIA, Kim Hyong-wook, shortly after the constitutional amendment struggle in the fall of 1969, obviously as a deal with Park's opponents within the government party, and maybe in Park's own interest. Now the CIA is led by Lee Hu-rak, Park's right hand man for many years and one of the strongest men in Park Chung-hee's inner circle.

4. Anti-Communism

What makes it easy for the CIA to operate among the people is the deep-rooted anti-communism. It is partly a result of the experiences of the Korean war, which was conducted brutally on both sides, and partly a fruit of permanent anti-communist education and propaganda. Anti-communism in the very primitive form of creating fear of the "Red Devils" is incorporated in all school books and even university curricula, cinema news, and military training. Anti-communist slogans and postures are everywhere. News about "armed agents" who, for example, allegedly have bottles of poison with them in order to kill hundreds of

people by poisoning wells, appears in the newspapers at almost regular intervals, with special emphasis at pre-election times. Many of these stories can be recognized as concocted, but even critical Korean intellectuals believe them.

There is a very handy Anti-Communism Law which allows one to brand any criticism of the government as "communist" and thus make it the object of special legal procedures (no evidence is required) and extremely severe punishments. And anybody, who is stamped a communist agent, will find no sympathizer or supporter among South Koreans.

There is very little substance to this official anti-communism. It simply is against "communism," thus rallying support for any government and any policy, which is anti-communist. More sophisticated college students would identify anti-communism with "democracy" as a political system based on "free elections," and "capitalism" as an economic system based on "private property." The function of this ideology is not so much protection against "the enemy in the North" but suppression of any opposition within the South.

5. Student Protest

There is a long tradition of students' political involvement in Korea. In 1919 and 1929 students led uprisings against Japanese colonial rule. In 1960 student demonstrations led to the resignation of Syngman Rhee's dictatorial regime. In 1964/65 students violently protested against the Korean-Japanese Normalization Treaty. There were also smaller protest movements against rigged elections (1967), corruption (1966, 1971), constitutional amendment (1969), social injustice and labor problems (1970), and military drill on campus (1971). This tradition, however, seems to be a burden rather than a help for South Korea's students today. They tend to see themselves as an elite and as saviors of the nation, although their demonstrations nowadays fail to gain popular support. And, remembering April 1960, they easily overestimate the power of their demonstrations, which regularly are stopped by a well-equipped riot-police before they can even take to the streets.

From 1970 on student leaders began to become aware of their isolation from the people and their lack of political consciousness and analytic theory. Political groups and illegal student papers as well as first contacts with the labor movement began to develop. But they were completely crushed when, on October 15, 1971, after a few days of ordinary student demonstrations, Park Chung-hee ordered elite troops to occupy the six leading universities, had all others closed, more than thousand students arrested, several thousand drafted into the army, and four student leaders accused of high treason. Thus, the student protest movement in Korea, as in other countries where it failed to become a mass movement, is no longer, if it ever was, a political force the powerful regime has to fear.

6. The Labor Movement

Perhaps we should say that there is no labor movement in South Korea. There are labor unions which have organized 470,000 members in 17 industrial unions and form the Federation of Korean Trade Unions. But the history of these labor organizations is not that of a genuine labor movement. Since the time of the anti-Japanese struggle through the years of Syngman Rhee, the student uprising and the military coup, again and again the unions were organized from top to bottom to serve as instruments of those in power.[40] After the U.S. military government had outlawed the Communist unions soon after the liberation, there was no longer socialism, the natural ideology for a true labor movement, among organized workers.

At present the unions are very much shop-oriented and concerned with wage questions alone. Most union representatives at branch level are paid by the company, and often the whole union of that company is a "yellow dog" union. Many union leaders are closely related to the government party and not a few are corrupt enough to cooperate with the CIA. But there are also signs, that, at the grass-roots and among the leaders, too, a new orientation is growing, a consciousness of a wider responsibility for social justice in South Korea. However, before the unions can become a powerful force in South Korea's political system, they would have to double their membership and strengthen the workers' class consciousness to become a strong and representative organization which could be called a labor movement. Both steps are extremely difficult under present circumstances.

Since skilled laborers are, and increasingly will

be, in demand in the growing industries, there is theoretically a chance for the unions to gain some power. On the other hand, the army of unemployed unskilled or semi-skilled workers is so large (the official figure of 4.5% is meaningless) and is, because of rural poverty, growing so fast, that it is very difficult to organize workers. South Korea has good labor laws—on paper—which theoretically give workers protection and the unions all the rights they need, including the right to strike. But in reality the government, from the labor inspectors up to the president, is on the side of those who can pay. Foreign capital, which the government wants to attract for investment, already enjoys special "protection."[41] This protection now is extended to all private capital in South Korea since the president in December 1971 was given special emergency powers, including the right to freeze wages and decide labor disputes. As long as this "emergency" lasts, there is no room for an independent free labor movement to develop.

7. Big Business

Most difficult to analyze because it is less public even than the CIA is the economic-political structure, most inadquately called "Big Business."

A recent government survey showed[42] that the markets of most of the important products are monopolized by a handful of manufacturers. Explosives, soda ash, aluminum, rayon yarn, and three-wheeled trucks are completely monopolized by one firm each. Two firms each share the market for buses, trucks, sugar, glutamate, electric wires, plate-glass, and beer. For the following items five companies dominate 30% of the market: automobile lubricants, auto tire tubes, cement, transformers, antibiotics, multi-vitamin pills, television receivers, reinforced steel, plywood, and electric generators. Although this says something about the economic and political power of those monopoly firms, it is almost impossible to find out how these firms are connected among one another, who owns what, and how the big concerns are structured. Since there are not yet mass share-holders there is very little publicity. As in the pioneer epoch of industrialization in Europe or North America, many of these concerns are one-man empires.

Unfortunately even less information is available about the interrelation between Big Business and politics. One can only guess from symptoms. There are certainly direct personal ties in many cases.[43] But they may not be as important as financial ties.

Since the government pretends to be democratic, much money is needed to conduct and win elections. Also, the big machine of the government party and the CIA and their "special expenses" require a lot of money. Therefore one can assume that the government depends to a large degree on "donations" from those who control big capital.

On the other hand, the power of a government which does not abide by the law and can regulate every detail to one's favor or disfavor is so great that businessmen depend to an even larger degree on the good will of government officials or government leaders. They need approvals, permissions, licences for so many activities, particularly for import, foreign loans, and export subsidies, taxation is so "free" and public fees so "flexible" that there are innumerable occasions to pay for a "favor."

Thus corruption at all levels has grown to such proportions that even President Park has repeatedly deplored the situation and called for stern measures. But as long as there is private control over big capital there will be corruption.

What is the actual political influence of Big Business? This is hard to say and harder to verify. But judging from the government's policy concerning investments, tax favors, exports, agriculture, the labor unions, urbanization, etc., one can only assume that the political influence of the economic leaders must be great enough to push for a policy which serves their interests.

IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION

We have reviewed a variety of aspects of South Korea's economic, social and political life. On some aspects, such as mass media and the judicial system, there is not sufficient information. One important aspect, foreign relations, particularly U.S. and Japanese influence on South Korea as well as South-North Korean relations, would easily make up another essay.

Analysis and interpretation of the present South Korean society is the main purpose of this essay. Such interpretation, when it focuses on a few main points, cannot represent the "full picture." Inevitably it will be "onesided." But it has legitimacy if it succeeds in structuring a dis-

South Korean worker processing Japanese raw material in an automated chemical fibre plant.

organized flood of data, thus making them more understandable and showing their interrelationship as well as some of their origins. "Pure description" (if there can be description without implicit interpretation) cannot achieve this. Capitalism serves as the interpretive instrument of this analysis. In clarifying its meaning, we will first recall the most important observations of the previous three sections.

Among the aspects of the economic system we found most striking was the tremendous growth of South Korea's GNP. This growth was, however, achieved at the price of a neglected agriculture, high inflation, and dangerously high inflow of foreign capital, mainly as loans. This expansion occurred predominantly in the secondary industries, more precisely in the consumption-oriented industries. Since the domestic market could not absorb the overproduction, the government began heavily to subsidize exports of these commodities although their production increased imports and foreign debts.

We further saw that the predominance of manufacturing industries in Korea's economic development stems from the fact that the biggest share of all available capital, domestic and foreign, is at the disposal of private investors, who, naturally, are interested in a fast return of maximum profit. Under such a system, agriculture, infrastructure, and "investment in man" (health, education, culture) necessarily are neglected. Therefore, we now conclude that capitalism is not a suitable economic system to develop a a country in the broad sense of human development. It may be good at creating fast GNP-growth rates, since the profit interest of private

investors directs the investments where the fastest growth can be expected. But this produces a sectorally and regionally unbalanced economic development which creates tensions within the system and moves a temporary boom into a structural crisis as can now be observed in South Korea. And is it not true that maximum GNP-growth is itself a capitalist goal? We must reject the assumption that development—humane development—can be measured in GNP-growth or per-capita income. The social aspects of South Korea's development should warn us.

Most strikingly, we observed the problems of an uncontrolled urbanization: growing slums, air- and water-pollution, traffic congestion, housing shortage, worsened by unrestricted land speculation, and the widening gap between those who enjoy a luxurious life and those who can hardly make a living. We saw that this urban explosion is related to the neglect of agriculture and that both phenomena serve to guarantee the manufacturing industries, particularly the export industries, a large and cheap labor force. Apart from the income- and wealth-polarization (the necessary accumulation of capital favors only a few), we noticed the emergence of the new class of workers and employees, who are extremely dependent upon employers. Further, we observed class barriers in the educational and health care system. Both aspects are concerned with basic human needs, and we can see that a purely capitalist society is not able to meet these needs equally for all. It creates and protects classes of privileged people.

The main aspects of South Korea's political system complete the picture: dictatorial concentration of power in the hands of the president; a well organized government party; manipulated elections; a large military machine and efficient secret services; well controlled mass media, military discipline for all ages; elimination of student protest and labor movement, and an omnipresent ideology of anti-communism with obvious domestic purposes.

All this supports a social-economic system which cannot survive for long because of its inner tensions and contradictions. If a government boasts of economic successes—but ones the vast majority can only observe, and not enjoy—then control of inevitable social unrest will be needed. If a government creates a high rate of inflation but cannot allow wages to rise because export products would no longer be competitive and foreign investments no longer interesting—then corruption of the labor unions is unavoidable. If a government pretends to be democratic but is bound to break the rules in order to stay in power—then manipulation of elections, elimination of student protest, and suppression of public criticism is inevitable.

In fact, an economic system which benefits but a few and exploits the masses cannot afford to have free elections, free press, and free mass movements. This is the basic contradiction between capitalism in the narrow sense of an economic system and parliamentary democracy as a political system. This contradiction we can also observe in other capitalist developing countries (such as Taiwan, Thailand, South Vietnam, the Philippines, most Latin American states, and the "white" African countries). We even begin to rediscover it in the seemingly democratic, but perhaps only superficially democratic societies of Western Europe and North America.

Whether capitalism is a term which can be universally applied to all non-socialist industrializing or highly industrialized societies without becoming a mere slogan, we need not and cannot sufficiently discuss in this article. For our subject, the South Korean society, there is no other analytic term which adequately expresses the specific interrelationship of South Korea's economic, social and political system. The alliance of interests between those in power and those in business who can maintain their joint rule only through a system of suppression, is best characterized by the term capitalism. It indicates that the core of this economic-political system is the fact that the wealth of a nation, although collectively created and accumulated, is gathered in the hands of a few private owners of productive capital who can use their economic power to support a political power which serves their interests. The term capitalism further indicates private disposal of profits.[44] Even if the private capital owners, domestic or foreign, spend only a small portion of their wealth in consumption of luxury goods or in capital transactions out of the country, and even if they reinvest most of their gains, sitll the private owners' profit-oriented investments are not all investments in the people's interest. This we can observe in a capitalist developing country like South Korea as well as in our waste-making economies with

material affluence, cultural poverty, and social injustice.

This conflict between private profit interest and general interest of the people is basic and the same for any capitalist society, be it England in the early 19th century, or the U.S. in the late 20th century, or South Korea living in both epochs. Of course, there are interesting differences between these stages and situations. Particularly the role of the state, the function of international trade, or the forms of social control are quite different in the three types of capitalism mentioned above. For example, the government has much more economic power and influence in South Korea today than the English government had at the time of Manchester liberalism. The South Korean government has so many ways of granting or refusing privileges in taxation, loan distribution (control of foreign capital), foreign trade licenses, legislation and administration, that one might think that capitalists depend on government rather than government being their instrument. Also, the potential conflict between, for example, Korean and Japanese econmoic interests in South Korea seem to benefit the Korean government rather than harm it. But certainly the South Korean government also depends on Big Business to finance its expensive machine of control, manipulation and suppression. Further, any anti-capitalist policy would discourage domestic and foreign investment, thus depriving the government of its economic basis. Thus, it seems to be useless and unimportant to speculate about who depends more on whom.

The government's stronger position stems, among other reasons, from a different international situation. Industrialization in Europe occurred partly through exploitation of colonies, and in the U.S. the first capital was accumulated through expropriation of the Indians lands and exploitation of black slaves. On the contrary, present industrializing countries, most of them having been exploited as colonies themselves, have no outside resources to draw on, and therefore depend on foreign capital for fast accumulation (and they have, for various reasons, less time than the European societies had). While the early European capitalists met only one another as equal competitors when they began to develop world trade, capitalists in today's developing countries meet highly superior economic powers who already control the world market. For these and for other reasons capitalists in newly industrializing countries need and tolerate more governmental economic activities than their early European or North American predecessors did. Therefore, one might call this form of capitalism a "government directed capitalism." But is that much different from what we observe in the U.S. or in Western Europe today, where Big Business needs and expects more and more economic involvement by the governments concerned in order to avoid severe crises?

Certainly the type of police-state control of social unrest and mass organization in early European capitalism and—technically more efficient—that in capitalist developing countries today, is different from a more refined method of social control through public education, mass media, and consumption affluency, as can be seen in relatively liberal capitalist countries such as West Germany or the U.S.

However, differences which can be noted between capitalism of the type Karl Marx analyzed and of the kind we now can see in developing countries like South Korea do not seem to be very important and fundamental. The one, undifferentiated term capitalism which signals the existence of private control over a nation's wealth still seems to be clear and concise enough to name and characterize a social, economic, and political system such as the one analyzed in this article.

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[1] These and all following data are, if not otherwise indictated, taken from or calculated out of government statistics, mostly *Korea Statistical Yearbook 1970,* published by the Economic Planning Board of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, 1970; most 1970 data are from *Monthly Statistics of Korea,* No. 3, 1971, also published by the Economic Planning Board. Growth rate 1971 from *The Korea Times,* December 25, 1971.

[2] *Korea Statistical Yearbook 1970,* Tab. 49.

[3] This accounts for the years 1964-1968. Before 1964 domestic savings were much lower. In 1969 they reached 57% *(op. cit.,* Tab 57), in 1970 64% *(Monthly Statistics,* 3/71, Tab. 10), and dropped to 56% in 1971 *(The Korea Times,* Dec. 25, 1971).

[3a] *Far Eastern Economic Review,* August 28, 1971, p. 71.

[4] *The Korea Times (TKT),* January 4, 1971.

[5] *TKT,* October 10, 1971.

[5a] Of the approved foreign investments (in June 1971) 49 million were for electronics or electrical equipment, 38 million for petroleum, and 21 million each for chemicals, and textiles or garments (total at the time 244 million).

Far Eastern Economic Review, August 28, 1971, p. 71.

[6] According to a Bank of Korea report, contradicting a higher government figure. *TKT,* March 27, 1971.

[7] Korea imported $405 million worth of raw and semi-processed materials in order to export $835 million! *TKT,* March 27, 1971.

[8] According to a survey of the 1968 exports. *TKT,* August 15, 1969.

[9] *TKT,* August 15, 1969.

[10] In 1970, despite a bumper crop in 1969, one-fifth of the nation's rice demand had to be imported (worth $140 million) while total exports that year earned $835 million.

[11] Bank of Korea report from December, 1970.

[12] From a report of the Korea Economic Research Center.

[13] A 1970 survey of the Korean Farm Culture Research Association.

[14] Bank of Korea survey.

[15] Figures from *TKT,* January 1, 1972.

[16] *The Second Five Year Economic Development Plan,* Seoul 1966.

[17] *TKT,* December 26, 1970.

[18] *TKT,* November 30, 1971.

[19] *TKT,* November 30, 1971.

[20] *Statistical Yearbook of Seoul,* 1970.

[21] Early in 1972 Seoul's City Hall ordered that all seats be removed from public buses so that they could carry more passengers.

[22] In April, 1971, the Transportation Ministry lifted even the inadequate existing "restrictions" on private car license approvals. *TKT,* April 11, 1971.

[23] Dust fall-out in Seoul is 38 tons on the average per month/km^2 (in downtown areas 67.7 tons), while the safety level is set at 6.5 tons. Taegu chalks up 48 tons. In Japan's major cities it was 14 tons in 1965. *TKT,* May 20, 1970.

[24] *The Washington Post,* December 18, 1970. The Han River around Seoul has a BOD of between 18 and 39 PPM while the international standard for safe water is 4-5 PPM. *TKT,* January 1, 1971.

[25] See table 1/68 of *A Study in Urban Slum Population,* undertaken in 1966 and published by the College of Medicine and School of Public Health, Seoul National University, Seoul, 1967. More recent and more comprehensive data can be expected from *A Low Income Housing Area Survey* by the Institute for Urban Studies of Yonsei University, Seoul, which in the fall of 1971 was in the stage of evaluation.

[26] See table 1/67 in the *Study in Urban Slum Population.*

[27] A tentative, not yet published result of the survey mentioned under [25] *supra.*

[28] In fact, in 1969 the average daily household income in slum areas was found to be 300 Won (1 Dollar). Source: see [27] *supra.*

[28a] The exact figures for 1970 are (taken or calculated from *Monthly Statistics of Korea,* 3/1971, Tab. 3 and 6, in millions): economically active population: 10.020; "employed" 9.574; in agriculture, forestry, and fishery 4.834; in mining and manufacturing 1.369 (of which 0.393 were self-employed or family workers), in social overhead and other services 3.371 (of which 1.359 were self-employed or family workers), leaving 0.446 as officially "unemployed."

[29] According to government statistics and a Won-Dollar-rate of then 300:1.

[30] 639 out of 1,467 townships or 43.5%, according to statistics of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. *TKT,* July 18, 1970.

[31] 47% of the 5,400 hospitals and clinics are located in Seoul and Busan *(Health Manpower Study,* School of Public Health, Seoul National University, 1970).

[32] From the study mentioned under [31] *supra.* Same result from a government survey, *TKT,* November 22, 1969.

[33] According to an oral information from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs there are 12 doctors for every 10,000 people in Seoul, while there are 2 to 4 physicians for 10,000 people in rural provinces (including the provincial cities). The statistical doctor-patient ratio then is 1:833 in Seoul and 1:5,000 or 1:2,500 in rural provinces (provincial average).

[34] *Health Manpower Study* (figures rounded): there were some 8,000 physicians registered in 1967 for a population of 30 million. About 2,000 of them were non-active or abroad, 1,250 were serving in the army (resulting in a doctor-patient ratio of 1:480 young, healthy men), and roughly 2,000 were practicing in Seoul, leaving less than 3,000 for the rest of the country.

[35] According to a report from the Ministry of Health, *TKT,* March 30, 1971.

[36] Only 6.6% of rural people make use of health centers, according to a Health Ministry survey, *TKT,* November 22, 1969.

[37] An existing minority faction within the DRP under Kim Jong-pil's leadership was completely eradicated by Park Chung-hee during the years 1968 to 1971; mainly because there was considerable resistance within the DRP against a constitutional revision to allow Park a third presidential candidacy.

[38] The DRP faction, at 2 a.m., Sunday, September 14, 1969, held a secret meeting in a dark annex building without informing the opposition party or the public. Nobody from outside the DRP was there to count the votes of this "constitutional amendment."

[39] Naturally the quantitative effect of this kind of manipulation cannot be verified since only single cases became known. The author heard of one case where a DRP man voted seven times.

[40] For the history of Korean unionism see: Park Young-ki, *Unionism and Labor Legislation in Korea. Korea Observer,* vol. 1/2, 1969, p. 94-102.

[41] If a company has more than $100,000 foreign capital, all labor disputes can be subject to immediate compulsory arbitration by the government. In the Free Trade Zone now under construction around the southern port city Masan, which is to attract foreign, particularly Japanese investors for exclusive export production, labor unions are completely banned.

[42] *TKT,* April 3, 1971.

[43] E.g. the chairman of the parliament's Construction Committee for some time was one of the big cement producers.

[44] Since, therefore, private ownership of the means of production is part of the definition of capitalism, the term "private capitalism" is a redundancy.

South Korean Mercenaries in Vietnam

An Expose of the Nixon Doctrine

Ingredients—Murder, Rape, Arson

By JAMES ARONSON

Since 1965, a total of 360,000 troops of the South Korean Army have served in rotation in Vietnam, bought and paid for by the American taxpayer at a cost of $1 billion, and leaving behind them a record of bestiality that will have earned for them for years to come the hatred of all Vietnamese.

If the 360,000 figure sounds like a propaganda fantasy concocted by a peace activist suffering from battle fatigue, be disabused: it is a fact set down by the South Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C. Some of the story has been published in radical journals. Other information has appeared sporadically—rather as the one-day-wonder kind of story—in such newspapers as The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post.* Almost all of it is based on three separate reports about the presence and activity of South Korean troops in South Vietnam—reports which have reached to the highest echelons of the Department of Defense in Washington only to die a deliberate death. A coroner's report would have to read: suffocated in a classified pigeonhole.

All in all, it adds up to a tale of mercenary horror, with the chief villains of the piece based not in Vietnam, but in Washington. Two national administrations are involved: that of Lyndon Johnson and his policy of escalation of the war in Southeast Asia, and that of Richard Nixon, with the policy of the so-called Nixon Doctrine to let Asians kill Asians in the interest of American imperialism.

All the material in this article has been carefully researched and tested. It is based to a large extent on the work of serious scholars of Asian affairs, on Senate committee hearings, and on the testimony of Americans who served at various times with branches of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, known as MACV. And not least of all, it is based on the revelations of the Pentagon Papers whose authenticity has been denied by no American official, not even those whose particular deceit was laid bare in the pages of the Papers. The sources will be credited, but it is wise, in order to keep a chronologically clear head, to begin at the beginning.

In 1965, when President Johnson was stepping up the war in Vietnam to the accompaniment of growing restlessness at home, he needed a device to persuade the American people that the war was indeed a "collective response against aggression." The only kind of collective Johnson could muster, however, was one he could collect and pay for himself—that is, one the United States Treasury would pay for. So he collected some token Thais and Filipinos with outsize enlistment bonuses, and then went after some bigger fish—the South Koreans.

The "more flags" strategy, of course, had a precedent in Korea itself in 1950, when the United States maneuvered to cover its intervention in South Korea with the multi-nation flag of the United Nations. The government at Seoul, however, had become adept at dealing with its great protector in Washington and drove a hard bargain. The South Koreans were not about to send troops to South Vietnam unless the United

James Aronson, a former member of the staff of The New York Times *and other newspapers, is a founder and former editor of the* National Guardian *newsweekly, one of the few newspapers in the United States that opposed United States intervention in Korea in 1950. He is the author of* The Press and the Cold War *and the just-published* Deadline for the Media *(Bobbs-Merrill),* and Packaging the News *(New World Paperbacks). He is a frequent writer and commentator about the American media. He is a founding sponsor of AKFIC.*

States would finance replacements for troops that would have to be removed from the demilitarized zone separating South and North Korea.

A revealing description of the bargaining was presented in an interview with Liberation News Service by a member of the United States armed forces who for obvious reasons had to remain anonymous. He was a cryptographer and teletype operator with two tours of duty in South Korea, the second with the Eighth United States Army Communications Center in Seoul from June 1964 to August 1965. This is the story he told LNS in March 1970:

> There was a teleconference in March 1965 in which I was pulled out of bed at 3 a.m. to engineer. . . . It was set up just when [Vice President] Humphrey had been trying to convince the South Koreans that they should send actual ground combat troops to South Vietnam. The South Koreans would not give him a straight answer on the spot. They were looking for things they wanted before they would send troops. What happened was that the American ambassador and the man in charge for the commanding general—commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command, a four-star general named House, were delegated to conduct the negotiations with the Koreans for troops.

The anonymous soldier was the operating engineer for the classified conference and, he reported, "the U.S. gave the Koreans everything they demanded." On the Washington end of the hookup was General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a General Johnson, and they spoke mainly with General House. Also involved was Admiral Sharp, commander in chief of the Pacific forces. The engineer reported:

> The Koreans were after five additional divisions and they wanted improved weapons. They wanted things like 175mm howitzers, self-propelled 155mm howitzers, and they wanted tactical missiles with nuclear warheads. . . . They got three additional divisions to replace the divisions that would be pulled off the DMZ and sent to Vietnam. They also got the plans to mobilize two more divisions out of the reserves for extended active duty. They got heavy artillery for several battalions, plus the operational control of them. They also received Honest Johns and nuclear warheads to go with them.

Where did the decision come from to give the Koreans these weapons, the communications engineer was asked. The reply: "It came from Washington."

Washington also devised a cosmetic plan to deceive the Congress and the public. In 1965 the Defense Department presented the Korea troops dispatch as growing out of a request for assistance by the government in Saigon. And in grateful remembrance of United States assistance fifteen years earlier, the government at Seoul hastened to comply.

The deception was exposed by the Pentagon Papers and in testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970. The facts were that Saigon at first opposed the idea of Korean troops and yielded only after pressure from Washington; and that the United States paid the freight for the entire Korean operation.

Firmer and more persistent objections came also from Pyongyang. Premier Kim Il Sung on several occasions went out of his way to express North Korea's solidarity with the Vietnamese, north and south, who were resisting the United States-Saigon forces, and promised full support. As a manifest that Pyongyang saw resistance to the United States as a common struggle, it increased its forces along the DMZ in Korea beginning in 1966, thus forcing the South Korean government to maintain its own considerable force on its side of the DMZ. Troops frozen in place could hardly be spared for Vietnam.

It will be recalled also that the *Pueblo* incident took place at the peak of South Korean buildup in Vietnam—in January 1968, just before the Tet offensive which marked the beginning of the end of the Johnson escalation. As a result of the *Pueblo* seizure by the North Korean navy, the United States diverted fleet and air units from Vietnam to South Korean waters. While it would be pure speculation to say that Pyongyang coordinated its actions with those of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam—there is no evidence that this was the case—it was eminently clear that Pyongyang took the measures in full sympathy with the Vietnamese resistance.

The first South Korean units sent to South Vietnam in February 1965 were called the "Dove



Puppet Presidents Thieu and Park have a lot in common as they discuss role of South Vietnam and South Korea in President Nixon's Asian doctrine during 1969 meeting in Seoul.

Unit." Their mission was described as "humane." With the American decision in April 1965 for massive intervention, Seoul dispatched an infantry division supported by a marine brigade totalling 20,000 men. In 1966 another division followed, with a regimental combat team and support forces (24,000 men). In 1967, 3,000 more marines went in.

A disptach to the *New York Times* from Craig Whitney in Saigon (November 9, 1972) described how the Korean operation worked:

> The United States pays salary differentials —in Korea a private makes about $2 a month, here $40; brings them and their equipment on American vessels; provides helicopter transport and gunship support; flies soldiers home on vacation if they extend their tours of duty, and gives them privileges in post exchanges. The Koreans' liberal use of the privileges is legendary.
>
> "It's all written into an international contract," said one of the American liaison officers with the South Korean Tiger Division near Quinhon. "Everything is in that contract —right down to the three grains of rice in the rattraps."
>
> The Korean command—a spit-and-polish American-style headquarters halfway between Saigon and Cholon that is always surrounded by gleaming jeeps and limousines—claims the killing of more than 41,000 Communist soldiers since 1965 and puts its losses at 3,700 killed and 8,300 wounded.

As with the "body count" and "kill ratio" news conferences in Saigon (which came to be known among American reporters as the "Five O'Clock Follies"), the phrase "Communist soldiers" camouflaged acts of atrocity and horror committed against the civilian population of South Vietnam by the South Korean troops. Little has been published about this for two reasons (1) the indifference of the American media, and (2) censorship of news about activities of the South Korean troops in the South Korean press.

From 1966 through 1969, however, at least three reports were submitted and circulated among military and civilian planners in Washington and Saigon indicting the South Korean

troops for the deliberate and wanton murder of hundreds of Vietnamese civilians. Two of the reports were made public, in part, early in 1970 by their authors—both at the time the reports were compiled devoted researchers in the employ of the Defense Department, and both earnest supporters of the American effort in Vietnam. All three reports were discussed in an article in *Ramparts* magazine (September 1972) by a respected authority on Asian affairs, a military intelligence officer in Korea during the 1950s, who wrote under the pseudonym James Otis. Following is a summary of the reports and the circumstances surrounding them.

The *New York Times* on January 10, 1970. published a story based on an interview with A. Terry Rambo, a graduate student at the University of Hawaii. Rambo and two colleagues, Jerry M. Tinker and John D. Lenoir, had been researchers for Human Science Research (HSR) of McLean, Virginia, on a refugee interview project for the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency. Rambo told the *Times* that he had reported to "a group of high-ranking American officers in Saigon" that there had been widespread killing of Vietnamese civilians by South Korean troops. Rambo briefed the officers in 1966. Shortly thereafter he was "ordered by a general officer of MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) staff to cease investigating the Koreans—and no mention of it was made in our reports."

The Rambo team prepared two reports—one with the atrocity information, and one without it. This was done because they were sure that if only one report, with the atrocities, was submitted, it would be classified and cubby-holed. Sure enough, the "clean" version, titled "The Refugee Situation in Phu Yen Province, Vietnam," was published in July 1967. The atrocity stories were included in a report titled "Korean Marine Behavior Toward Vietnamese Civilians in Phu Yen Province," and submitted to the Department of Defense. It was immediately marked "Secret" and locked away. The Department has refused to make it available even to the Senate Subcommittee on Escapees and Refugees—let alone make it public. As late as January 1970, the Pentagon was telling inquirers that the "clean" Rambo report published in 1967 had not been completed.

The same article in the *Times* quoted Rambo as saying he had heard of a report by the Rand Corporation, the Defense Department's chief civilian research arm, confirming his findings of atrocities. The Rand study, he said, found that the "Vietcong infrastructure in the villages in the Korean zone 'was breaking up because they were afraid—not afraid of being found out, afraid of being killed at random.'"

A Rand Corporation spokesman in Santa Monica, California, told the *Times*: "There has been no Rand research of any substantive nature involving the behavior of South Korean troops in South Vietnam. There have been some references to rumors about Korean troop behavior included in some of our reports, but since they did not involve Rand research, we can only regard them as hearsay."

This comment was exposed as a deliberate evasion, if not an outright lie, the following day in the *Times*. A Washington bureau story quoted a Rand staff member, who asked not to be named, as saying that he had conducted interviews in Vietnam for Rand which turned up allegations of "potentially lurid" happenings involved in South Korean military "pacification" techniques in South Vietnamese villages. These allegations had been made to American interviewers under United States government contracts to conduct a "major study of the progress of the war."

Then, on January 12, 1970, the *Washington Post* and *The New York Times* published stories based on interviews with Francis West, a Rand researcher of Santa Monica, who said he had received information about South Korean brutality in South Vietnam; and while the information was "hearsay, I am pretty convinced instances of brutality did occur."

The same papers on the same day reported Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird's appearance on the CBS TV-radio program "Face the Nation" on January 11. Asked about the atrocity reports, Laird said that his department had had "certain reports" about atrocities, but that they had "not been substantiated in the legal way." In any case, he said, the alleged atrocities were not the responsibility of the United States government since there was no "unified command" in South Vietnam. Apparently the responsibility of the United States extended to the hiring of the killers—not to their acts.

West revealed that in December 1969 he had

reported his findings directly to Undersecretary of Defense (now Secretary) Elliot Richardson, among others. He said he had made his report "at the direct urging" of an admiral and a high Defense Department official. There was "no muzzling, no whitewash," he said. Only inaction.

Other reports began to come to light in 1970. In the July issue of *Playboy* magazine there was a devastating description of South Korean troop behavior by Jesse Frank Frosch, an Army intelligence lieutenant assigned to the advisory team at Quangngai province at the time of the Songmy incident in March 1968. He said that the Songmy area was the scene of a "staggering slaughter of civilians" by troops of the South Korean Marine Brigade in late 1967. (Frosch later joined the staff of United Press International.)

In 1967, Frosch wrote, the South Koreans reported that they had killed more than 700 "Vietcong troops" in a sweep through the Songmy area. However, Frosch added, a South Korean officer had told him the South Koreans had encountered no enemy forces, and implied that the victims were civilians. Frosch wrote: "The Koreans had committed the first Songmy massacre and left it a legacy of hate for the incoming Americans of Task Force Barker."

Adding confirmation to the grim compilation was still another report—this one to the State Department—in December 1971, oddly enough in the department's own semi-official *Foreign Service Journal*. The author was a foreign service officer named John Marks (he had written under the pseudonym John Claymore) who reported on the investigation of a colleague who had served in Vietnam and had accumulated his own "file of documented atrocities, including photographs," about the activities of the South Korean marines from 1967 to 1970. According to Marks, the officer "has written extensive reports on the apparent war crimes he investigated in Vietnam. As far as he knows no action has ever been taken to punish the guilty."

Finally, in June 1972, the scope of governmental duplicity was uncovered by a small news organization named Alternate Features Service (AFS) of Berkeley, California. AFS had come into possession of a Rand Corporation report, dated December 6, 1966, and innocuously titled "Mention of Korean Troop Activities in Rand Interviews." The report was based on interviews with "Vietcong captives, ralliers [deserters], and civilian refugees, between March and November 1966." No effort had been made to verify the allegations, the preface said, and no effort made to draw any conclusions from them. With this exit hatch, the report them went on to detail a campaign of horror whose authenticity could hardly be doubted—even in the dehumanizing settings of a Rand-Pentagon report.

The document tells of the murder of civilians in six villages in Phu Yen and Binh Dinh provinces, and of the prevailing fear the villagers had of South Korean troops. A refugee from Hoa My village in Phu Yen told a Rand interviewer how ten elderly men had gone out to meet a Korean unit near the hamlet. They were lined up and shot. The refugee's story continued:

> This irrational killing wasn't unique. From what I heard from the people, that very morning a similar incident had taken place in neighboring Thanh Phu hamlet of the same village. Early that morning, the Korean troops came into Thanh Phu. Most of the people had run into the field at the time. Only 50 villagers still lagged behind. Most of them were women, children, and elderly people. The Korean soldiers rounded them up in one place. The people thought they were going to be evacuated to the GVN (Saigon)-controlled areas. That's why they were all glad. When the people were grouped together, the Koreans suddenly pointed their guns to the crowd and opened fire. Only two babies of two or three survived. They crawled on their mothers' bellies.
>
> After seeing those who were killed in my hamlet, and hearing about the massacre of the Thanh Phu hamlet, the people were frightened. Nobody dared come into the hamlet. They all tried to run toward the GVN-controlled areas. That night everybody slept in the field in the neighboring hamlet. We stayed there for two days, then ran to the GVN-controlled areas. Those who reached here after us said that a number of old people, women and children couldn't make it here in time. They were all shot to death by the Koreans. All in all, nearly 100 persons killed in my hamlet, 36 of them children.

An NLF prisoner reported another episode: ". . . when the Korean troops came, they called to all the old women and children down in the trenches to come up. Then these people were told to sit in circles. Afterwards, the Korean troops machine-gunned them."

A refugee told the interviewer: "Everybody agreed that the Koreans were barbarous. They went on operations without interpreters going along. They killed at random without distinguishing between the rights and wrongs. Some people said it was because the VC mixed themselves with the villagers, and thus the Koreans couldn't help making a mistake. I don't think the reasoning was right. I don't see why Koreans should kill children. Kids of two or three, or even five or seven years weren't VC. They also burned the paddy and the people's houses. They burned the cow pens and the animals inside too. Cows are certainly not VC!"

The Rand report went to headquarters in Santa Monica where it was suppressed. A former Rand analyst, Melvin Gurtov, who had worked at Rand from 1967 to 1971, and was one of the authors of the Pentagon Papers, explained:

> That it was suppressed means that it never went further than being a "document." A "document" is merely a draft circulated for comments within Rand, as opposed to a published study, which is nicely bound and sent on. This doesn't necessarily mean that it didn't go to the Pentagon. Sometimes something never becomes more than a "document" *because* it went to the Pentagon.

Nicely packaged or not, an atrocity is an atrocity. In a letter to The *New York Times* published on January 25, 1970, Professor Frank Baldwin of the East Asian Institute at Columbia University wrote:

> The Korean reprisal policy in Vietnam—the execution of every tenth person in a village to terrorize the civilian population—has been an open secret in Korea for several years.

He said that during a 1966-67 trip to South Korea, he found that United States officials there would admit to such incidents, "sometimes with regret, but usually with admiration." One American observer of an atrocity, however, did not look on with admiration. He was David Bishop L/Cpl., "H" Co., 2d Bn., 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, testifying about atrocities committed against Vietnamese nurses by South Korean marines in Quangnam province in August-September 1969. The testimony was from the Special Winter Soldier Supplement published by *American Report*, May 21, 1971.

> The operation was Meade River, a very large-scale operation. On part of the operation, we had just gotten through making heavy contact, and we went through a bunker system. It was a large bunker system, and we found hospitals. We came across four NVA [North Vietnamese Army] nurses that were hiding out in one of the bunkers. They were nurses. We found medical supplies on them, and they had black uniforms on. The ROK [Republic of Korea] marines came up to us and one of their officers asked if they could have the NVA nurses. They would take care of them because we were sweeping through the area. We couldn't take care of any POWs. So that instead of killing them, we handed them over to the ROK marines. Well, we were still in the area when the ROK marines started tying them down to the ground.
>
> They tied their hands to the ground, spread-eagled them, and raped all four. There was maybe ten or twenty ROK marines involved. They tortured them, sliced off their breasts, used machetes, and cut off parts of their fingers and things like this. When that was over, they took pop-up flares (which are aluminum canisters you hit with your hand; it'll shoot maybe—100-200 feet in the air). They stuck them up their vaginas—all four of them—and blew the tops of their heads off.

Secretary Laird would say that the matter of the Vietnam nurses was a question to be taken up between Saigon and Seoul—if he would countenance the testimony of Corporal Bishop in the first place. But as the gorge rises and tears of frustration well on reading such a story, it should be recalled as "James Otis" wrote in the September 1972 *Ramparts*:

> The plain fact of the matter is that the

Nixon and Park—the buyer, the seller of mercenary troops for Vietnam.

American High Command—from General Abrams to President Nixon—knows that ROK troops pillage and murder and rape civilians as part of their normal operations in Vietnam. The United States recruited these troops. It trained them, fed them, clothed them, and armed them. It transported them to Vietnam, consigned them an area of operation, flew them into combat, gave them artilllery, air, and logistical support, and pays them—and their government—a huge fee for their services. If now the U.S. government does nothing to halt their unchecked brutality, then it condones and authorizes such activities.

Thus, at the heart of the matter, is the Nixon Doctrine: Let Asians kill Asians. It is a marvelously simple formula for continuing counter-insurgency operations at minimal cost and risk. It accomplishes three goals:

1. It reduces domestic opposition to foreign intervention by American forces by making American involvement less visible.

2. With a low profile for the American presence in these foreign adventures, it rouses less foreign opposition.

3. Foreign troops cost less to maintain. While the Korean troops, at $40 a month per head, still make 20 times what they would serving in their homeland, they still cost the United States government only one fifteenth as much as it costs to maintain an American soldier abroad. That's quiet a saving—let alone the fact that a dead Korean costs infinitely less than a dead American, both in burial costs and in domestic grief. (The figures for the cost per head of American troops abroad, as against Asian troops, were supplied by Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, a latter-day dove, in testimony before a Congressional committee in 1969.)

There are some additional figures which are pertinent to a discussion of the Nixon Doctrine,

or its predecessor—the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson Doctrine. According to Alternate Features Service, the United States, between 1950 and 1968, had spent $2½ billion to maintain the South Korean army—in addition to hundreds of millions of dollars in surplus U.S. military equipment. It costs Washington at present $150 million a year to support the South Korean military and, as noted earlier, maintenance of South Korean troops in South Vietnam has already cost more than $1 billion since 1965.

First-line beneficiaries of this policy, besides the corrupt Korean army and government officials who traffic in American arms, are Korean construction firms and manufacturers of war materiel. And since much of South Korean business is controlled by American and Japanese interests, the profits are plowed back home, or to Tokyo, where they are reinvested in the manufacture of Japanese war materiel. It is high-level ring-around-the-rosy profit-taking, and any moral ingredient added by the Pentagon propaganda machine is sickening gloss. Discussing the South Korean troops in Vietnam at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1970, Chairman J. W. Fulbright said:

> It does not really add up very well that this is a great gesture of self-sacrifice on the part of Korea to pay their obligation. They were simply making a good business deal at our request and urging.

President Park Chung Hee of South Korea does not require much urging, despite his shrewd bargaining techniques. His collaboration with the United States military has turned South Korea into a vast garrison state, with over 612,000 men in the armed forces—the sixth largest standing army in the world, exceeded only by another American ally—the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan. The army controls communications and transportation in South Korea, and occupies strategic sites throughout the country. There are frequent alerts and joint training exercises with United States troops. Above all, the army is President Park's major weapon for suppression of all opposition forces.

Incredibly, South Korean forces in South Vietnam in October 1972 outnumbered United States troops. There were still 38,000 ROK soldiers there on October 2, an increase of 1,200 over the previous week. Had any of them been disciplined as the result of the various reports and investigations? Charles W. Bray 3d, a State Department spokesman, said in February 1972 that he "believed" some soldiers had been punished. Not so, said foreign service officer Marks, whose article in the *Foreign Service Journal* had produced a momentary stir. It was "common knowledge," said Marks in a new letter to the *Journal*, among Americans in Vietnam that the Korean troops were "continually and regularly committing acts that would be defined under the Geneva Convention as war crimes." American reporters knew this, he said, then added charitably that it had never been dealt with extensively in the American press because of lack of hard evidence.

Marks said "half a dozen" former officials in Vietnam, since transferred to Washington, shared his belief that the actual, if not official, policy of the United States embassy in Vietnam was to "play down crimes committed by the Koreans in order not to jeopardize the continued presence of Korean troops in Vietnam, and in order not to injure Korean-American relations." This "passive tolerance," he said, extended to knowledge within the American embassy in Saigon of "widespread corruption, currency manipulation, and diversion of supplies." He continued:

> The Korean troops have become so entrenched in their coastal enclaves that, according to an authoritative source, they recently refused high-level American urging to shift their forces to the much more critical central highlands and demilitarized zone region.

The *Washington Post*, on August 22, 1972, reinforced the Marks contention. "The South Koreans," it said, "have not ventured far outside their traditional operating areas in recent years, though the U.S. has pressured them to do so on several occasions. The Koreans also used both divisions [in South Vietnam] to improve the combat readiness of their entire army, shuttling officers from South Korea through those divisions for combat training."

This was confirmed in turn last fall by *Korea*

Week, the official bulletin of the South Korean embassy in Washington. Since 1965, it said, "about 360,000 South Koreans (about 60 per cent of the total military manpower) have served in South Vietnam for a year." For the Nixon Doctrine, it was a perfect setup: Asians sent to South Vietnam to kill Asians, and to make them even more proficient in killing still more Asians in the future. For Park Chung Hee, it was a barrel of gold, with never a bottom in sight, his for the having with a periodic application of blackmail. For example:

On New Year's Day 1972, Park said that the 40,000 South Korean troops in Vietnam would be pulled out by the end of the year. After the successes of the NLF offensive last spring, President Nixon wrote to Park urging him to postpone the withdrawal. In June, Secretary Laird announced that United States forces in South Korea, scheduled for early departure, would not be pulled out at least until June 1973.

In a tempering statement from Seoul, government officials on September 7 announced that they would begin to withdraw their troops from Vietnam before the end of the year, but did not say how long it would take—an open-ended policy. No schedule had been set, but it would be a slow one. In Seoul, the word was that Park had indeed altered his policy on withdrawal in return for a Nixon guarantee that American ground troops would remain in South Korea until mid-1973. In Washington there were the usual denials that there was any connection between the two non-withdrawal plans.

In a dispatch from Seoul on September 14 to The *New York Times*, Richard Halloran said that Park's generals were opposed to keeping their troops in Vietnam because American and other troops were being pulled out, and that South Korea had fulfilled its commitment. They were said to be "stung" also by criticism of their troops' behavior. If so, this was the first public indication of any embarrassment. Between the lines in the *Times*, a student of South Korean government behavior would discern that far from advising Park not to yield to Washington, his generals advised him to hold out for the usual bargaining terms. So the old charade was played: Park "overrode" his advisers and "ordered a postponement" of the withdrawal, apparently after getting precisely what he wanted. What he wanted became clear in the succeeding months, as he abrogated even the semblance of constitutional rule in South Korea and sought to ensure a lifetime reign for himself.

Meanwhile, in South Vietnam, life for the South Korean troops proceeded as usual: comfortable living in their rear bases and periodic marauding missions against the civilian population whose democracy they had come to preserve. There were about 39,000 South Koreans in Vietnam at the last report in November 1972, "effectively retired" to their rear bases, according to Craig Whitney, writing to The *New York Times* from Saigon on November 9. Among their contributions to raising the level of Vietnamese culture, Whitney said, "they count among the most important of their accomplishments the spreading of the cult of taekwondo, or karate."

Another "accomplishment" was recorded last October, when the Tiger Division spent three weeks sweeping the hills in the Dongxuan district of Phu Yen province, cordoning off 2,000 inhabitants. They reported "150 Communists killed." But "the enemy had left by the time the Koreans had arrived, according to American advisers." Whitney reported:

> Repeated operations like that in the midst of the population have led to charges that the Koreans have deliberately killed civilians. "Our troops have been harassed for seven years about atrocities," the Korean information officer, Lieut. Col. Y. J. Chung, complained. "Whenever they have been investigated they have been proven wrong. Our Korean forces have been the target of VC propaganda."

If that is so, then two former American Friends Service Committee volunteers must be listed among the VC propagandists. Whitney recorded the findings of two volunteers, Diane and Michael Jones, who spent four months interviewing villagers on the central coast and prepared a study. They reported:

> In all, we heard from local sources reports of more than 45 specific incidents in which Korean soldiers were said to have killed groups of over 20 unarmed civilians. In 13 of the cases, over 100 civilians were reported

killed. . . In most of the large massacres the people were not killed until they had been rounded up into groups, and then often were forced to line up. In four different accounts from Quangngai, Korean soldiers were said to have passed out candy and cigarettes to the people, especially to the children, before killing them.

Significantly, the Joneses reported, "people also thought that the Americans, as tactical commanders, were responsible for the Korean brutality. Many felt the Koreans were ordered by Americans to pacify 'insecure' areas in which they were told that all the people were Vietcong. As the Koreans usually did not have interpreters with them when they went out on operations, they had no way to communicate with the people."

Since the Koreans, except for these sporadic expeditions, have "retired" to their bases, a fair question would be: Why keep them in South Vietnam? The answer, once again, lies in the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine. As distasteful as the Koreans may be to the Saigon government, President Thieu is increasingly desperate as his situation continues to deteriorate, and he clings to whatever help he can get. But beyond that, the Koreans are important to Washington's strategy, as are the CIA armies—the Meo tribesmen, the Lao Theung, the Lao irregulars, and "Thai volunteers." They are the expendable fighting arm of the Doctrine, and their presence —made possible only by American arms and money—is regarded as an effective means of keeping down domestic insurgency without the dispatch of American troops.

In the last analysis, as has been proved, none of this will succeed. But it is part of the ugly mythology of the American strategic planners operating with Asian human fodder. The immediate result is implacable hatred among the mass of Asians for the planners of their wanton murder and the destruction of their land and homes. The long-range result will be the inevitable expulsion of American personnel and power.

Thus the drama proceeds. In the last months of 1972, it seemed to be coming to a climax in Korea itself where, in the midst of tentative negotiations between North and South looking toward reunification of the country, President Park played out the role of desperate dictator. The Constitution—in effect with minimal application since 1948—was wiped out; the National Assembly was disbanded, and extraordinary martial law was imposed. Each page of each newspaper in Seoul carried a small box reading "kun kumyul pil"—or, "military censorship-passed."

From Pyongyang came this comment: "This is an evident sign that the South Korean rulers fear the South Korean people; it is designed to dampen their desire and aspiration for the peaceful reunification of the country and further intensify the suppression of the people demanding democratic rights and freedom."

In a dispatch to the *Washington Post* from Seoul on October 23, 1972, Don Oberdorfer wrote that the United States did not approve Park's "coup in office." But, he added, "regardless of its troops still in Korea and its aid in trade concessions which shore this country up, the United States seems content to let President Park go his own way, or too paralyzed to do anything about it."

If it is paralysis, then it is planned paralysis. The link between the Korean war and Vietnam is clear. Korea, in a sense, was a testing ground for Washington's intervention in Southeast Asia. It seems apparent that the goal of United States strategy is to achieve in Vietnam the "Koreanization" of the peninsula—a stalemate in which there is a veneer of peace, with American influence left intact. If Asians kill Asians during the uneasy peace that may follow—well, that's the way it has to be. After all, none of the dead—or very few—will be white.

In the planning rooms and on the wall maps of the Pentagon, in the computers which tick off in advance body counts and kill ratios, and the cost of bribery and corruption, it all works out to the satisfaction of the policy makers and their advisers.

There is, however, one element that does not fit into a computer. That is the determination of the people of Asia to be masters of their own lives and their own lands. No solution has yet been found to the dilemma of programming this element into the imperial computer without causing electronic chaos.

The Specter of Unification is Haunting the Park Chung Hee Regime

BY JOSEPH BRANDT

"Martial Law in South Korea Discourages Reunification"; National Assembly Dissolved"; "Martial Law Imposed;" "Constitution Partially Suspended"; Activities of All Political Parties, Political Press Activities, Assemblies, Demonstrations Banned and All Universities Closed."

Such were the headlines in the world press the week of October 17, 1972.

On that day the Park Chung Hee government further tightened its grip on the South Korean country and people.

By proclaiming "extraordinary martial law" on top of the "national state of emergency" already in existence since December 1971, the Park Chung Hee regime finalized the seizure of dictatorial power, guaranteed Park's term of office for president for life and further solidified its fascist dictatorial rule.

Using deception and lies South Korean reactionaries attempt to delude the Korean people and world public opinion by imposing their "extraordinary measures" under the guise of "coping with changing international situations and backing up peace and peaceful reunification."

The South Korean reactionaries want "peaceful reunification" from the barrel of the gun based on the outworn cold war thesis of "reunification by prevailing over communism" which they hope will lead to the "destruction of socialism" in the north.

This was pronounced a delusion long ago by North Korean premier Kim Il Sung when he declared, "It is obvious that the question of reunification of our nation cannot be solved without the Communists, since they have become a solid guiding force in the northern half of the country where all the people have accepted Communist ideology and are building a new, happy life under its banner."

The Japanese press in reporting the October 17 declaration of martial law described the terror-ridden atmosphere in Seoul as follows:

"A little past 6 p.m. that day a large number of tanks and armored cars appeared in the streets and fully armed paratroops and special units were deployed around the 'National Assembly,' government buildings, newspapers, radio stations, and the traffic of citizens was suspended.

"No one can see students going to schools. There are only bayonet-carrying soldiers on duty here and there and heavy tanks and armored cars.

"Heavily armed soldiers bearing white arm bands reading 'martial law force' stand guard at the doors of the elevators in every floor of buildings of universities and colleges, newspaper offices, radio stations and other places and buildings directly or indirectly connected with politics."

Referendum at the Point of a Bayonet

On October 27, 1972, the South Korean reactionaries forced upon the people a closely supervised referendum in the existing martial law atmosphere to ratify "Park Hee's moves to exercise almost complete power for an unlimited time." The major provisions of the referendum to change the constitution are: 1) Park Chung Hee will be allowed unlimited number of six-year terms, thus making him president for life; 2) in place of the National Assembly, a "National Conference for Unification" composed of 2,359 delegates was chosen for a 6 year term to re-elect Park Chung Hee to power; 3) The "The National Conference for Unification" under Park Chung Hee's chairmanship is em-

(Continued on Page 34)

PARK RIVAL IN SEOUL ASSAILS U.S., JAPAN

Special to The New York Times

TOKYO, Nov. 10—A leader of the South Korean opposition criticized the United States and Japan today, charging that they are helping President Park Chung Hee and other Asian strongmen to become dictators.

The leader, Kim Dae Jung, who got 46 per cent of the vote in the presidential race against Mr. Park last year, charged that democratic forces in Asia "are being oppressed and destroyed with the mon... ie dictatoria... ere strength... eapons and e... ded them... ates and Jap... Mr. Kim, a m... itional Asse... re no arrests... were advise... Outside of th... lly.

As often happ... proclaimed in... cified his acti... healthy and... our democrat... said it was... dition for prog... invaluable So... outh Korea an... in negotiation... s to reunite f... olitical commit... nsula peaceful... dent Park said... gue, "we can't... l disunity wh... have complet... ing their peo... officials said... ed the timing... Red Cross dele... o meet in the N... Pyongyang Tue... ov. 22 while t... is scheduled t... on Nov. 2... 30.

porters of Pres... hat opposition... ng and critici... policy on re... l reasons. The... rtial law was t... d potential diss... adership, reduce... Cabinet to admi... mposed strict ce... edia and stifle...

December, the ... a state of natio... tified that as nec... negotiations wi... ring, he decreed... the economy. Th... was open to ... Korea has no s... sloyalty of the pe... ent.

ark, who came ... a military coup, ... t in 1963 and ag... ir, he had a tw... out of the Cons... cted for a third ... g to well-placed s... dent intends to ... ion so that he ma... ns of six years ea... n parties, reduce ... uthority of the N...

was dissolved under martial law on Oct. 17, said to a ... of newsmen that ur... United States and Jap... to undertake immedi... change in their mistak... cies, the people of As... have no hope of winning ... freedom or bread will ... tably turn to Comm... which at least will gua... them bread."

Mr. Kim's charges w... rare public criticism of ... dent Park, who has sile... his opponents. Mr. Kim w... Tokyo on personal busines...

Officials here said that ... view of this...

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1972

Seoul's Military Chiefs Back President

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 18—Major commanders of South Korea's 600,000-man armed forces held an emergency meeting here today and pledged to support fully the imposition of martial law announced yesterday by President Park Chung ...

their resolution of support, his spokesman, Kim Sung Jin, said.

The South Korean newspapers, which are subject to strict censorship by military officers, have not printed any comment critical of the Government.

Leaders of the Opposition New Democratic party were not available for comment. The party headquarters was occupied by troops and no civilians were allowed to enter. However, Kim Dae Jung, a prominent member of the New Democratic party and its presidential candidate in 1971, who was on a visit to Tokyo, said according to Agence France-Presse, that Mr. Park's action was "totally undemocratic" and aimed at perpetuating ...

At least a dozen civic organizations and business associations, such as the National Teachers Federation, the Association of Reservists and the Korean Chamber of Commerce, issued statements supporting Mr. Park's drastic moves. Some ran the full text of the statements in newspapers as paid advertisements.

Meanwhile, strong criticism of Mr. Park's action came from Pyongyang. North Korea's official press agency charged in a commentary broadcast today that the South Korean President had proclaimed martial law "to dampen the desire and aspiration of the South Korean people for peaceful ...

e, called by Yu Jae Heung was attended rs of the army, and marine the chief of ...

eting, Mr. Yu they had re- y support the ordinary meas- positively par- reformation of itical structure."

Park Said to Plan Changes To Extend Tenure in Seoul

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 19—President Park Chung Hee intends to revise the South Korean Constitution so that he may remain in power for at least another 12 years, well-placed sources said today.

The sources, who asked not to be identified because of the tense political situation here, said the constitutional revisions would allow Mr. Park two terms of six years each, beginning with his re-election later this year.

Other revisions would strengthen his already firm hold on power through a mixture of presidential and parliamentary government systems similar to those of France under President Charles de Gaulle.

Political Unity Stressed

The President's official spokesman, Kim Seong Jin, declined to confirm Mr. Park's plans. Mr. Kim said, however: "We need to have unity in order to have a dialogue with the North. We can't afford to risk political disunity when the North Koreans have ...

President Park would have the authority to appoint a third of the National Assembly, with the approval of the national conference.

The N... thus ha... and wou... year, at ... dent calle... President ... power to ... Assembly.

The revis... provision o... stitution tha... intends to ... armed force... placed by a ... the exploratio... unification.

Criticism Ca...

Leaders of ... parties here ha... Government of u... action in opening ... North Korea. Offi... criticism was on... proclaiming martia... revising the Consti...

The South Korean ... Koreans have been ... Red ...

ROK Put Under Extra Martial Law

Malaki Daily News

SEOUL (AFP) — South Korean President Park Chung Hee Tuesday proclaimed an extraordinary martial law throughout the country, as of 1900 hours local (7 p.m. JST) Tuesday.

In a nationwide radio address, President Park declared the National Assembly dissolved and all political activities ceased.

Pres. Park

Park said his ex... were no arrests, but Opposition leaders were advised to "stay home."

Outside of that, life went on normally.

As often happens when martial law is proclaimed in Asia, President Park justified his action as necessary for "the healthy and sound development of our democratic institutions." He also said it was necessary as a condition for progress in "the peaceful but invaluable South-North dialogue" between South Korea and North Korea.

South Korea and North Ko... begun negotiations through the Red Cross to reunite families and ... a political committee to re... peninsula peacefully. A spok... President Park said that, to... dialogue, "we can't afford t... litical disunity when the ... reans have complete contro... erything their people say ... Other officials said those r... dictated the timing of the r... The Red Cross delegations ... uled to meet in the North K... tal of Pyongyang Tuesday ... on Nov. 22 while the p... mittee is scheduled to me... yang on Nov. 2 and ... Nov. 30.

Supporters of Preside... position po...

al order will be normalized by the end of this year at the latest when the required constitutional amendment is adopted.

He named as commander-in-chief of martial law General Roh Jae Hyon, army chief of staff.

As the president spoke over a nationwide radio and television network, scores of tanks and armored cars were seen entering into the heart of the capital, taking positions at strategic points.

The president assured the ordinary citizens' life or economic activities will in no wi... be hampered by the marti... law and pledged to "... coopti... the dialogue with North Ko... as scheduled.

announcement did ... constitu...

mediate ban on any political assembly or demonstration and, at the same time, closed down all universities "for the time being."

The existing curfew between ... and 4 a.m. will con... All mass ...

President ...

AN OPEN ...

PRESIDENT PA... REPUBLIC...

Mr. President:

The undersigned Koreans and Am... well-being of Korea, cannot remain s... of martial law on October 17 and ... South Korea. We believe that an ove... share our sentiment.

We urge you to restore democratic ... martial law but the emergency rule d...

South Korea

Park's Plan for Staying in Power

SEOUL—Tanks and armored personnel carriers and machine guns were posted before the South Korean capitol and National Assembly here last week. Helmeted soldiers with rifles and fixed bayonets stood guard at Government buildings, communication centers, opposition party headquarters and universities.

But it was all spit-and-polish. The ... like the pre... election, wo... turned out only to provide ... President Park ...

Seoul Cabinet Takes Legislative ...

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 23 — The South Korean Cabinet issued three special laws today in preparation for a national referendum to be held next month to change the Constitution.

The special laws, and two presidential decrees to carry them out, were published while a South Korean delegation was traveling to Pyongyang through the border camp at Panmunjom for the third round of Red Cross talks with North Korea on proposed family contacts between the two Koreas.

One of the new laws gives the Cabinet legislative powers in the absence of the National Assembly, which was dissolved by President Park Chung Hee last Tuesday, when he proclaimed martial law. President promised that a legislature would be formed the year's end to return South Korea to constitutional rule.

mittees included some members recommended by major political parties. All political activity has now been banned by ...

sists of seven offi... seven advisers ... accompanied by ... Lee Bum Suk, t... delegation, said ... ...ained in Pyong...

MARTIAL LAW SET BY SEOUL REGIME

SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 17—President Park Chung Hee proclaimed martial law tonight throughout South Korea, suspended part of the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and suspended all political activities.

Press censorship was also imposed, and all universities and colleges were closed.

In a statement broadcast just before the martial law went into effect at 7 P.M., Mr. Park ...

United Pre...

Gen. Roh Jae H... chief, details ...



Park Gives Plan to Extend Seoul Rule

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Friday, Oct. 27—President Park Chung Hee of South Korea formally proposed today sweeping constitutional changes that would pave the way for him to remain in power for life.

The proposed new constitution, which has to be approved by a national referendum next month, provides no limitations on the number of terms a president may serve. Under the existing constitution, which was suspended by Mr. Park on Oct. 17 when he proclaimed martial law, he may not seek another term in 1975, when his third four-year term expires.

Under the new charter the President, who is 55 years old, would be elected for a six-year term by a "National Conference for Unification" consisting of 2,000 to 5,000 delegates to be chosen by a popular vote

There is little doubt here that he can win a new election, now expected to be held in December. Martial law is seen certain to remain in force and all political party activities would continue to be banned until late December, when Mr. Park promised to restore normal constitutional rule.

To orient the new constitution toward r... tion, its pr... contains a c... one of the R... basic ideals ... of "the hi... peaceful un... therland."

The Nati... Unification ... a supreme ... cide on m... fication. ... have six-y... not be p...

Now Korea

President Park Chung Hee's proclamation o... law in South Korea strikes another embarrassi... at the moral underpinning of United States policy

Forty-three thousand American troops, bac... massive economic and military aid, still stand g... this free world frontier. Now the bastions of f... have been breached, not by an external aggressor ... the very leader who was entrusted with preserv... least the semblance of free institutions.

some basic civil liberties. Some of these aleady are restricted under the state of emergency declared in December.

¶The president would be able to call national referendums on major national policies.

The new constitution would retain the previous economic provisions calling for free enterprises, with the government having the right to exercise controls necessary "for the re... ...stice and ...

Park Declares Martial Law Dissolves Assembly, Calls For Constitutional Reform

Seoul (AP)—South Korean President Park Chung Hee Tuesday proclaimed mar... tial law, suspended some provisions of the constitution and dissoived the one ... house National Assembly.

THE DAILY YOMIURI

The former army four-star general also said he would propose revisions to the present constitution by October 27 and call a national referendum one month later on the constitutional amendments.

The president said he would restore constitutional rule by the end of the year "at the latest."

A special presidential statement said martial law went into effect as of 7 pm Tuesday —1000 GMT.

The president said that despite the extraordinary measures, his nation would continue to observe all its commitments to its allies and would protect the interests of foreign investors in Korea.

The announcement was read by presidential spokesman Kim Seong Jin to a hurriedly called news conference, which was nationally televised and broadcast.

The president said he was taking the sweeping measures to reform the national structure to better ... territorial re... moment when ...

Following t... a taped st... Park was als... cast.

He banne... tivities and ... ent cabinet, ... the functio... the suspen... he was m... ment.

in his proclamation announced press censorship but there was no mention of restrictions on outgoing foreign press dispatches.

The general also announced that trips abroad by Koreans will be carefully screened, but he did not say they would be banned.

Park said in his statement:

"We are now faced with a crucial time when we should move forward with the South-North dialogue more positively and courageously while overcoming the harsh challenges of rapidly changing international situations.

"What are most urgently required of us at this moment are constant wisdom, unflinching courage and inseparable unity. We must urgently make a readjustment of our political institutions in order that the difficult but invaluable South-North dialogue can most effectively be backed up by these elements of vigor and vitality and that we can positively adapt ourselves to the fast ... international situa...

U.S. Voices Disapproval

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17—The ... has conveyed ... the South Korean Governm... ...in the "stiffest terms" its ... approval of the imposition ... martial law by President Pa... State Department officials sa... Secretary of State William P... Rogers expressed the United ... States objections to ... ment. "In Korea...

...esent constitution, ...ws and ordinances ...esent political stru... ...were ab...

'Bid To Keep Power'

South Korean President Park h... Chung Hee has placed his na... tion under martial law in ... order to retain his political ... power as long as possible, ... observers here said Tuesday. ... ...ources said the presi... ...amended the constitu... ...ensure ...tified the ...

structure which can best adapt itself to the needs of the newly developing situation."

He added that "bearing in mind the necessity and inevitability of such a great reformation and facing squarely the political realities in this country, I have arrived at the conclusion that this sort of reformation cannot be materialized by ordinary means."

He said, "I have made up my mind to faithfully accomplish the historical mission entrusted to me and to implement a structural reform by taking extraordinary measures —the structural reform which would conform to our realities and would best be suited for backing up the active pursuit of the South-North dialogue and ... for coping successfully with ... rapidly changing situation s... rounding us."

The martial law command... in his proclamation also clos... down all colleges and univ... sities "for the time being" a... said the present midnight-t... am curfew will continue as ... is.

He said travel by foreigne... to and from and within t... country will be guaranteed "... a maximum degree."

The president said he b... lieved his countrymen wou... support wholeheartedly the e... traordinary measures he w... taking, but added:

"In the case that the pr... posed amendments to the co... stitution are not approved ... the national referendum, I wi... take it as an expression of th... will of our people against th... South-North dialogue and ... therefore, will seek anothe... new approach to the task of na... tional unification."

He said, "We can hardly fin... any other political system bet... ter than the free democrati... one. Yet, free democratic sys... tem, being superb, may be... more vulnerable than any... other political systems if it is... not armed with its ability to... uphold itself."

He said his reform programe... are "to pave the way for peace... ful unification and prosperity ... by making the democratic in... stitution a truly viable system... capable of safeguarding itself

THE DAILY YOMIURI

Park Cancels Trip Here

South Korean President Park Chung Hee has cancel... his planned visit to Ja... in the middle of next ... government sources disclosed Tuesday. Park originally scheduled to ... to Japan as state guest ... ...vember 13 for a five... ...it, according to Kyodo.

...TER TO
...L CHUNG HEE,
...G KOREA

...deeply interested in the freedom ... ...e face of your inexcusable declarat... ... proposal to establish dictatorship ... majority of Koreans and Americ...

...South Korea by calling off not only ... you last year for the following reas... Republic of Korea as well as you... ...atorial powers in order to ... ...s louder: your interest is n... ...our rule. What has your life ... desire passionately?

...otiate with Premier Kim Il ... North Korea, Premier Kim ... politically. You yourself ac... confident of successful nego... in South Korea. Exactly. ... Republic of Korea alive.

those powers who gave ... ...d prosper as a free and den... and more bitterly against ... ...ne of consistently ... and re...

U.S. Voices Disapp... in 'Stiffest Term...

...ments to the nation's basi... with a view to laying a ... basis for the negotiations ... said the proposals would ... be put to a national referen... and he promised to re... normal constitutional order ... the end of this year at ... latest."

[In Washington, State ... partment officials said ... United States had convey... its disapproval of the martia...

(Continued from Page 31)
powered to "take necessary measures in the whole range of state affairs including internal affairs, foreign affairs, national defense, economic, financial and judicial affairs"; * 4) Park Chung Hee "will appoint 1/3 of the National Assembly which will have limited power and be in session only 150 days per year."

According to the *New York Times,* November 30, in a story by Richard Halloran from Seoul, "the referendum was conducted under the martial law proclaimed by Park Chung Hee on October 17. Under its provisions the press is subject to total pre-publication censorship with editors taking printed copies of each page to a military censor's office for approval. Thus, only articles and editorials supporting the constitutional revisions have been permitted.

"Political parties have been forbidden to comment on the new constitution and opposition leaders have been under house detention. The universities which have been centers of political dissent have remained closed.

"Persons who have criticized the new constitution, the government's campaign or President Park have been tried in court martial on charges of spreading 'groundless rumours' and have received 2 to 3 year prison sentences.

"As an example, Kim Pyong Uk, an executive assistant to a National Assemblyman of the opposition New Democratic party, was convicted this week of 'slandering the chief executive' while in a barber shop. His court-martial was conducted by an army lieutenant.

"On the other hand, President Park's administration conducted a wide-ranging campaign of 'enlightenment and guidance' to persuade Koreans to support the new constitution."

This is an example of the "Asian hands" that the Nixon doctrine proposes "to shape the Asian future," typical US imperialist "democratic rule" for client states.

This is not the first time this military reactionary, US-Japan supported clique has resorted to subverting the constitutional government and suspending the constitution.

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* On Dec. 23 the Conference convened and was chaired by Park Chung Hee. Of the 2,359 delegates present 2,357 "elected" the only candidate in the race, Park Chung Hee, for a six-year term as President of South Korea.

Martial Law a Way of Life for South Korea

Rule by decree, the proclamation of martial law, has by now become a way of life in this crisis ridden US-Japanese colonial protectorate.

Under the facade of time-worn bourgeois democratic shibboleths like "let us establish true Korean democracy" and "a renovated constitution," the reactionary military regime in effect put the finishing touches on its monopoly of power, completely and finally annihilating the last vestiges of bourgeois democracy in South Korea.

This process began in 1960 when, after widespread student demonstrations, the despised Syngman Rhee regime collapsed. It was then that the military Park Chung Hee clique took over by coup d'etat in 1961.

Then followed in 1965 the bloody suppression of the people's and especially the students' movement against normalizing diplomatic relations with the former occupying power, Japan.

The reactionary consolidation of power continued in 1969 with the destruction of people's organizations, the student movement, and opposition political parties by imposing the "constitutional amendment" guaranteeing the continuation of the Park Chung Hee regime for a third term in office.

In 1971 the student movement, overcoming weaknesses and demoralization, began again to challenge the Park Chung Hee dictatorship with the publication at the end of 1970 of its underground newspaper "Bell of Freedom" (Chayuui Jong) by a group of Seoul National University Law Students.

The student protests initially focused on the government extension of campus military training. They continued into the pre-election campaign for President and National Assembly (April and May, 1971).

The protests were finally suppressed when the army occupied the campuses in October 1971 and arrested the editor, Lee Shin-bom, for "plotting to overthrow the legally constituted government of the Republic."

During this period (1971) considerable student involvement in labor struggles centered around the suicide of the young worker Tae Il-chun (see story in this issue) and the murder of the trade-unionist, Kim Jin-soo.

The "Bell of Freedom" quoted a student who,

when discussing the suicide, said, "It has been proved beyond all doubt that the government's claims about modernization and improvement of living conditions are false." A foreign lecturer at Yonsei University, Dr. G. Breidenstein, was harassed and threatened with deportation for publicly lecturing about the suicide.

Using the army and secret police force to ruthlessly suppress the students' demonstrations, closing the universities, and imprisoning the leaders, Park Chung Hee once again resorted to dictatorial rule by declaring a "National State of Emergency" (December 26, 27, 1971).

Korean People Want Unification

Troubled by continued opposition at home and sudden Nixon shifts in realigning the Nixon Doctrine to better serve US imperialist interests in response to its Asian policies, Park Chung Hee found himself in deepening difficulties.

In response to the pressures of the people, both North and South, for a dialogue of reconciliation, Red Cross negotiations on both sides were initiated, finally culminating in the July 4, 1972 Unification Accord agreed to by North and South.

The July 4 North-South Unification Accord received the unanimous support of the people of North Korea.

It evoked sympathy and approval from wide sections of the people and some leaders in South Korea.

It was hailed as a cherished dream realizable by the hundred of thousands of Korean residents in foreign lands especially in Japan and the USA.

It was welcomed as a further step in the direction of lessening world tensions by progressive and peace loving people throughout the world.

Yet for the South Korean rulers—the generals, the capitalist exploiters, the rich landowners, and the US-made latifundia millionaires—the very thought of a unification dialogue was enough to drive them into desperation for fear they would lose their power and profits.

In our editorial on the unification declaration agreed upon by the North and South on July

"Look What We're Defending Now"

Martial law curbs South Korean press.

4, the AKFIC executive board and *Korea Focus* editorial board stated:

"Lest there be any illusions about the rate of progress toward unification, it is clear that the most reactionary forces in South Korea, all of them huddled within and about the government of President Park Chung Hee, will do their utmost to hinder that progress." (Fall 1972 issue of *Korea Focus*, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 4.)

These reactionaries in South Korean society abetted by their counterparts in the government and industrial establishments in the USA and Japan turned their backs on and sabotaged the implementation of the July 4 Unification Accord.

Only two months after signing the July 4 Accord the South Korean reactionaries, led by their USA-Japan masters, scuttled the debate on the Korean question in the United Nations.

Despite the insistent urging by the north for beginning the speedy implementation of the July 4 Accord, 100 days passed after the publication of the Accord before the first session of the chairmen of the co-ordinating committee convened. This delay was due to the sabotage and foot-dragging of the South Korean reactionaries, fearful of the peoples' power and the changes it portended.

No sooner had the July 4 Accord been signed than the South Korean reactionaries began a campaign of defamation, sabotage, and struggle against the implementation of the accord.

Their propaganda line was to the effect that "the joint statement which is no more than a sheet of paper cannot be trusted." A hue and cry was raised in the media once again demanding the worn-out, discredited line of "UN supervised elections," thus violating the principle of the accord which calls for unification on the basis of the independence of negotiating parties.

The South Korean reactionaries continued to imprison and execute proponents of peaceful and independent unification and other South Korean patriots who are struggling for the democratization of South Korean society. They have thus perpetuated North-South tensions and exacerbated antagonism and hostility among the South Korean people against their sisters and brothers in the North.

The Puppet World in Disarray

To put this whole matter in perspective, we must understand this recent drive of the South Korean reactionaries toward total power—paralleled by similar recent drives on the part of South Vietnam and Philippine reactionaries—within the context of the east Asian and world scenes. (See our editorial in *Korea Focus*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 8-9.)

The new Nixon maneuver of accommodation with socialist countries, let it be clear, does not aim to abandon imperialism but rather seeks to make it more "pragmatic" and effective. At the same time it has been forced to accept the principles of peaceful coexistence in relation to the socialist world. In their joint declaration of May 29, 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev agreed to "peaceful coexistence" and to "the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage."

The announcement of Nixon's trip to China—a pilgrimage of the vanquished opportunist—came as a shock to the Japanese. Nixon was forced to reassure them publicly and privately that the US had not abandoned its Asian junior partner. The fact is that in recent years the Japanese economy, along with European capitalist economies, has made serious inroads into the hegemony of the U.S. economy in the world

Seoul campus under martial law.

market, and Nixon is endeavoring to combat that rivalry.

The shock that hit Japan reverberated among the smaller puppet states of U.S. imperialism in East Asia. If the U.S. government can cynically desert its most favorite mistress, the Chiang Kai Shek-ruled Taiwan, what will it do with regard to its other parasitic call girl states, those country club cliques of rich businessmen, financiers, landlords, and generals sitting atop the stinking heaps of poverty in South Korea, South Vietnam, and the Philippines? In South Vietnam, President Thieu, U.S.-propelled mercenary of the "free world" against Communism, has since March imposed marital law, permitting police to arrest suspected Communists or Communist sympathizers; ruled by decree in national security and economy; closed all but two of Saigon's opposition newspapers; decreed that most village officials shall be appointed by province military chiefs under the government; and "left no room for an effective non-Communist opposition." (Craig R. Whitney, *New York Times,* September 25, 1972.)

In late September, 1972, President Marcos imposed martial law on the Philippines, banning strikes, picketing, meetings, and foreign travel, censoring all media, replacing civil courts with military ones, and arresting large numbers of Communists. The justification? "To preserve the freedom we cherish." That is the freedom of the local latifundia owners and exporters, the military, politicians, and foreign monopoly capital—*not* the freedom of the 80 per cent of the Philippine people who live in poverty and squalor.

And now comes South Korea. In its editorial, "Now Korea," the *New York Times* (October 22, 1972) commented: "The martial law has all the earmarks of a bid by the President to consolidate and perpetuate his power indefinitely. In this it bears disturbing resemblance to a parallel action by President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . and to similar suppressions of liberty by other United States allies in Vietnam and Cambodia."

What accounts for this common pattern of brutal fascist repression by these puppet governments? These puppets who have always ruled by war scares and terror find relaxation of world tensions, growing detente and peaceful co-existence a challenge to their corrupt rule. They realistically feel exposed, insecure, and threatened. The threat in each case comes from within—from the bourgeois, nationalist, reformist groups and from the real and rising unity of progressive forces. These groups and forces themselves have become stronger. Thus in order to survive, the reactionary regimes in these states must take increasingly severe measures against their opposition. If the people will rise up, then down with the people! In a letter to the *Voice of the People* (vol. 1, no. 12, December), an English-Korean language publication edited by Dr. Channing Liem, former South Korean ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Gregory Henderson for seven years a foreign service official in Seoul warns the south Korean government that should they call his references to "torture" false he has "some shocking pictures to send in reply. . . . Acts are being perpetrated on young students in today's jails which should stain every Korean heart with shame. . . . I told many Koreans whom I met that I considered it shameful that so many were silent. They have the government their silence deserves. It was Edmund Burke who wrote 200 years ago, "For evil to triumph it is only necessary that good men do nothing." Such repression is U.S. supported. As Kim Dae Jung, the opposition candidate to Park last year, said, democratic forces in Asia "are being oppressed and destroyed with the money and arms of the dictatorial regimes that were strengthened with the weapons and economic aid provided them by the United States and Japan." (*New York Times,* November 11, 1972). While U.S. imperialist troops are being driven from Vietnam, U.S. economic support, out of self-interest, continues to all these colonial regimes. At the same time the consolidating dictatorships are, like hunting dogs, straining at the leash to see how far their masters will let them go in the protection and extension of their own private and comprador appetites.

However, the process of reunification of North and South Korea persists. In spite of Park Chung Hee, the forces of popular demand, world events, and world opinion are too great for anyone to prevent the implementation of the July 4 Accord. As Nixon was forced against his own personal history and long held viewpoints to go to Peking and Moscow, so Park Chung Hee was forced against his own history and viewpoints to accede to the July 4 Accord. It is the U.S.-financed politicians, generals, and landowners in South Korea who stand in the way of reunification. Therefore, we call on all U.S. citizens to remove this support so that the reunification of the Korean people and nation, which is the will and longing of virtually all Koreans, as well as their right, can soon be realized.

We concur with the *New York Times* editorial (December 5, 1972) sentiment which said, "A critical element in the Korean confrontation has been the anachronistic presence of a United Nations (read United States—*Korea Focus* editor) command. . . .

"There is nothing sacrosanct about preserving the United Nations in Korea. . . . By now, its removal would be more cosmetic than substantial.

"If the United States does not take an initiative to reconsider the United Nations role in Korea, it might find itself on the defensive and outvoted on the issue at next year's General Assembly."

Amen. This is our most fervent hope and wish.

DON'T WASTE MY DEATH

By TAE-IL-CHUN

These moving extracts from the diary of a Korean laborer who burnt himself to death in Seoul are translated by David Boggett

"We are not machines! Employers, keep the Labour Standard Laws!" Thus read the placards sported by the Association of Cloth-Makers in a demonstration soliciting support to improve working conditions at Seoul's Pyongwha Market a year last November. Pyongwha Market consists of garment-makers' work-shops, the average floor-space of the small ones being three and a half square yards with a ceiling height of only four and a half feet. The employees, who receive less than five pounds a week, frequently suffer from eye-infections, indigestions and pneumonia, attributable to the bad ventilation and dust-ridden atmosphere. The Federation of Trade Unions and the government Labor Office refused to take action. Hence the Association of Cloth-Makers was formed last year to ameliorate these conditions by a foresighted young cutter of only 23, Tae-il Chun. The demonstration was dispersed by the police. In utter desperation, on November 12, 1970, by the main road at the entrance to Pyongwha Market, Tae-il Chun poured two cans of kerosene oil over his body and set himself alight. Ten hours later he was dead.

"Don't waste my death—many people are overworked in the market" claimed the dying boy. "Don't remove my body from the hospital until the officials promise to improve working conditions." The case was taken up by students and journalists with the result that some officials of the Labor Office were dismissed and various promises of improvement made. But Chun's death had started a major political controversy. "It has been proved past all doubt that the Government's claims about modernization are false," claimed one student leader. The opposition Presidential candidate at this April's elections, Dae-jung Kim, sent a wreath to the young laborer's funeral, stating, "Improving workers' conditions is one way of stopping communism."

The Government reacted sharply; two Seoul colleges were closed and a distinguished foreign lecturer at Yonsei University, Dr. Gerhard Breidenstein, was threatened with deportation for holding a public lecture about the death. Groups of students started circulating secretly Chun's Notebook—a collection of retrospective essays, notes, daily jottings and letters to his friend in Taegu, Won-sob. The *Dong-A Ilbo,* one of Seoul's leading newspapers, started to print some excerpts in Korean.

Chun's notebook itself became a controversy. The last eight pages, dealing with the all-important topic of organizing the Association of Cloth-Makers and the events leading to the fateful November demonstrations, mysteriously disappeared. Chun's mother claimed the notebook had been intact when she lent it to a *Dong-A Ilbo* journalist; the latter, however, stated that the pages had been missing when he received the book. Other parts of the notebook are totally illegible, being written in note form only. About one-third of the decipherable material was lost by students as they hurriedly prepared their printed leaflets.

Further complicating the task of translation was Chun's style itself. As Chun had but little formal education, his notebook presents difficulties even to his fellow-Koreans—at times his style is simple and strikingly real; at others, his grammar becomes so tortuous as to be virtually unintelligible. A strictly literal translation was impossible. The translators have tried to retain the former style while rendering the latter comprehensible to Western readers. Within these limits, however, the translation is as near to the original Korean as possible.

The four excerpts published here are from different sections of the notebook. The titles of the excerpts are those of the notebook itself, as is the title of the overall article. "Life in Pusan" (the second city and largest port of Korea) is a retrospective essay about events which occurred in Chun's mid-teens. The second excerpt, "In Seoul with Brother," recounts the difficulties of survival in Korea's capital when Tae-il and his younger brother, Hung-nae, tried to continue their schooling independently, having been driven from their Taegu home by an irate father.

The last two extracts are both from the section, "Life in Pyongwha Market." The first is a contemporary jotting after joining the Tong-il Sa garment shop at a fairly early stage in Chun's career at Pyongwha. The last excerpt, written after Chun had become a cutter, is from a letter to his school-friend in Taegu, Won-sob, and is probably—of the extant materials—the piece composed nearest in time to his death.

"My body covered in boils, I found myself on the beach, hungry and exhausted. I had gone to Yungdo Beach to find something to eat. The sun was scorching the dry earth, as if it would consume all in flames. Starving, I advanced my heavy feet from Pusanjin Railway Station to Yungdo Island where I used to live. Why are all those smugly smiling people so happy? Why should my heart alone be always troubled? Across the way I can see the City Hall and the road to Kukjae Market where the flags of many countries are fluttering—perhaps it is a special festival day? I hurried on. Who would be waiting for me at Yungdo Island? There might be a bowl of rice already gone bad, thrown away in some garbage box. I would go there! The winter jacket I was wearing soaked in the scorching sun's rays and boiled my morbid body. Now, profusely sweating, the boils pained me all the more. Itching fiercely all over, my body trembled like a mad invalid. At last I could see the bridge to Yungdo Island. As I was looking for a path leading under the bridge, something drew my attention. The pupils of my eyes, as sightless as the last flickers of a dying fluorescent lamp, blinking here and there, focussed on that something. There it was! Yellow bread piled on a round baking-frame!

"Whatever may have once been human in me had been totally numbed. I stopped before the baking hand-cart, wanting only to satisfy the basic, primitive instincts of a beast; something —I know not what—had paralyzed any sense of shame. It was rather a large hand-cart. But its owner was a young school-girl with a short haircut, whose age seemed less than 16 or 17 at the most. Had she not been a school-girl, I would have extended my begging paw. I can't understand now why all my courage had wilted so quickly before her. I swore in my heart that I would pass the baking hand-cart even though I might collapse in the effort—but my eyes remained rivetted on the round, yellow steaming bread. At last I passed by. My deadly pride had compelled me to walk away. Then I couldn't think of anything—totally exhausted and lifeless, I carefully descended the steps to the bottom of the bridge and there I found a fishing-boat approaching, gently swaying on the swell. Hoping that there might be something edible such as shell-fish or little oysters, I climbed the steep water-front. It was nine meters wide and thirty meters long. The further out one went, the narrower and lower it became. I went up to the end but I couldnt find anything. The sun was still burning as if it were going to vomit. The heat and the cold smell of the sea-water made my head throb.

"It was more like the water of a polluted stream running through the heart of a city than true sea-water. An odd shape was floating my way—it bobbed closer and closer; the small interior of a sea-cabbage, little bigger than a clenched fist. Just as it was about to pass, before I had even ascertained whether it had already been eaten, I quickly plunged into the sea. But it was too far! Before I had realized this, I was seized with nausea and all my movements seemed to be paralyzed. Would that I might survive! . . . that I might live!

"How long had passed? A faint noise broke upon my consciousness, more and more clearly. Where has the sea-cabbage gone? At the very moment I touched it, something had happened. Now there was a crowd of serious-looking and sympathetic faces staring at me as I lay stretched out on the ground. All those ugly faces! My body began to feel hot. The swollen skins, just like small-pox, must have been sterilized by the salt water. Under the scorching August sun the salt began to bite terribly into my nerves. I don't know who had taken off my clothes but my jacket and worn-out trousers were left beside me, stiff from the salt, like oil paper. I couldn't control my body, trembling from the heat. It was just like the shudder of a little dog after eating rat poison. I thought, were I to jump into the sea again, it would not be so hot. I had abruptly stood up when some person prevented me from moving. He grasped my two hands and didn't allow me to budge an inch. He told me a few hours later that he had thought I was going to kill myself by plunging into the sea once more. At that

time I had been seized by thoughts that I would rather find comfort in death than suffer such unbearable pain. An hour or so passed before the pain began to ease. As I was feeling better the fisherman with the straw-hat who had seized me went away, after silently handing me 35 won. Until that time I must have looked as if I loathed him but I hadn't been able to detect a single trace of antagonism on any corner of his face. He seemed to be a country-style fisherman. For his speechless sympathy, tears began to run down my cheek, my reddish cheek, as if the bank of a stream had been suddenly swept away by a rising flood. The onlookers began to depart from me, one by one. All gone, there lay beside me three 10-won notes and one 5-won coin, a yellowish cabbage, several shell-fish which someone must have left behind and my clothes; the wet jacket, the trousers with the worn-out knees and a pair of black sport shoes with but barely attached soles. In a few minutes the sun would drop into the clouds."

"My heart was full of gloom and dark forebodings. In a world so cold as this without even a place to sleep or any hope of work, and with the prospect of being penniless within a few days, I regretted all that had passed and longed for the miserable present to be obliterated. I went with my brother to Namdaemun Market where we each bought and ate a 10-won bowl of dumplings and soup. Then I purchased a shoe-shine box, with a brush and all other items necessary for shoe-shining. I told my brother, as he was younger, to go off and sell newspapers.

These are women garment workers of the Pyongnoha Market factories which Tae-il-Chun refers to in his diary.

Korean students fight to see to it that Tae-il-Chun's death is not wasted.

We decided to wander around together at first so that my brother could learn from me how to shine shoes until the newspapers were ready for sale at around 2 in the afternoon; then he would sell the newspapers. We had planned to meet together again in the evening. Maybe because I was wearing school uniform, few people asked for shoe-shining and I was frequently kicked by other boys. Somebody stole my tin of polish and by sun-set, I had earned only 30 won. When I returned to Nagwon Market my brother was already there waiting for me. He told me that he had sold only two newspapers and explained that he had tried in vain to enter tea-rooms and coffee-shops as the gangs of the other shoe-shine and street-boys had prevented him. He suggested that we might sell the newspapers when the other shoe-shine boys had gone.

"As icy darkness blanketed the clear blue sky, we began to walk towards the Mitopa Department Store to sell the remaining newspapers, dropping in at all the tea-rooms on the way. While I was selling newspapers in one of the tea-rooms my brother would wait at the entrance, and while my brother was selling in another I would wait outside to watch for any remaining shoe-shine boys. Alternating in this fashion we came to the entrance to Myongdong in front of the department store. There we saw a girl of my brother's age running hither and thither selling chewing-gum and toilet paper. Taking a hint from this, I decided to have my brother sell American chewing-gum and toilet paper. At around eleven we came to the Seoul railroad station to sell the four newspapers which we still had left. But as my brother saw passengers storming out of the station he stopped walking and turned his lifeless eyes upon me in a beseeching, weary gaze. At that moment his cheeks were covered in tears and there was not an ounce of strength in his choking voice. His listless stare made me lose all desire to sell the remaining newspapers and I watched with envy the passengers streaming out of the station in a great wave.

"All of a sudden, snow began falling from above. How depressed my brother must have been as he gazed at the other young boys of his own age skipping along with their parents on their way home. Speechless, I grabbed his cold hand and started towards Namdaemun Market. The snow was falling much more heavily now, as if it were summoning us to embrace a cold and empty loneliness."

"As I had become a skilled assistant-sewer, I was able to find a new job as a sewer of chil-

dren's trousers at the Tong-il Sa in a back alley of Pyongwha Market. They were working to produce a mounting demand for the season around the holiday of Chusok. As the orders had piled up, we were asked to work from 6:00 in the morning until 11:00 at night. Although we worked such long hours, if we were unable to meet the orders, then we had to work on throughout the night itself. The Tong-il Sa had more than ten sewing machines and the number of workers was more than thirty. Most of the workers there were all young girls around twenty years old; the male workers were only five in number—the cutter, the assistant cutter (who was the owner's nephew) and a thirty-five-year-old man who handled a special belt-driven sewing machine, myself and my brother. One day just before Chusok the shop was incomparably busy. I was particularly embittered by the fact that we were forced to spend the entire night working, as well as the long hours of the day. The most powerful man responsible for the workshop was the cutter. Nobody would dare to question his instructions. When we worked all through the night, our performance the next day dropped far below the average working output, but as we employees were the economic underdogs we couldn't improve anything. The employees were paid on a monthly basis according to the number of children's trousers they made, but there was a problem—namely, that there was no clear cut agreement on how much per piece (of trousers) they would be payed at the beginning of the month; it was only after the end of the month's work that the owner decided how much he would pay per piece, after consultations with the cutter.

"Because of this, although the employees might make a larger number of pieces due to a particularly high demand, their monthly salary was only just a little above the average. Since most of the workers were women, nobody tried to tackle this outrageous problem directly and most of the girls hardly dared to show any discontent. This was the first time that I had worked as a sewer in this type of work, but I thought that the whole shop was run very unreasonably; simply because, however diligently a person might work to make as many trousers as possible—even at the expense of sleeping—the system resulted in the employees being denied the proper reward for their sweat and toil.

Garment workers mourn death of Tae-il-Chun.

"However, people cared little about the problem and as only one male sewer, I could myself do little. Coming to the conclusion that the cutter was to blame, I decided to try to become a cutter at the earliest possible opportunity so that I could use my powers in that position to settle the problem in favor of the helpless workers. In fact, although most of the workers were paid according to the number of pieces they produced, such special jobs as those of cutter and assistant cutter were provided with a fixed monthly salary. In most of the workshops, except for the very big ones, the cutter had an almost absolute power, acting at the same time as the director of the workshop. So much power had he that he could decide upon such problems as employment and dismissal. Under this situation the cutter was an integral and indispensible part of the management and through him recommendations could be made to the owner. I felt, therefore, that the cutter should be a conscientious man, maintaining an absolute impartiality. The weakness was, however, that he was being paid by and was dependant upon the owner, so he naturally took the owner's view. When the busy work for the Chusok season was over, we took a day's holiday and I wandered around Pyongwha Market looking for an opportunity to learn the technique of cutting."

"My mind has been floating amid these stark realities. The shop where I am working has some thirty employees, making children's jumpers. We are now making Autumn sweaters, but shortly we will start making winter ones, sewing fur and other linings into them. Most of the employees are girls, their ages ranging from nineteen to twenty-three doing sewing, with those of ages fourteen to eighteen being their assistants. They begin to work around 8:30 in the morning and continue until 10 or 11:30 in the night. Don't you think it's too long? Here is a problem. If we count the working hours, how many do they have to work daily? As you can see, fourteen hours a day. How can they survive such long stretches of work? They are weaker than men and, what's more, sewing is a fairly strenuous work. If one separates mind from body, one cannot sew properly. Construction work requires physical strength and office work requires mental concentration, but a sewer needs both. It is so pitiful to see these clothmakers work for fourteen hours in so much dust, only to return to their homes at night utterly exhausted.

"As a cutter, I spend most of the day with these people. It's really hard. Think of a girl as young as only fourteen being scolded by her superiors, the cutters, because she cannot finish the great amount of work within the required time-limit. For lunch she eats as little to sustain her as an elephant would obtain in nourishment from a single piece of biscuit. They are so young but they are relentlessly engaged in a struggle for very existence itself. As you know, their hearts are ruthlessly crushed.

"Oh, you can hear now the noisy metallic whirr; the murmuring of the sewers intermingled with complaints, barely facing up to the realities of their situation. Amongst them I am diligently working. I am totally divorced from my job other than that I am working in accordance with the method I have been instructed. What I am doing is being done at this moment quite mechanically. In fact, I am nothing more than a mere onlooker. It is my body which is doing the work but nothing is controlling it. The atmosphere and the noisy surroundings make me work without thinking. Who cut these clothes? Then it suddenly comes to me that it was I who cut them. Having not in the least any desire to do these things, I don't know myself why I am doing them.

"When I dimly come to some realization of what I am doing, then it becomes time for me to leave for home. I wash my face and hands, change clothes, bid my farewells and return home. There the supper is awaiting me. The food is eaten, a few remarks are made, my body is laid down and thus the day comes to an end. The eerie loneliness of Autumn is coming upon me again, smiling, and I have always given in to that Autumn. Please don't pretend you know me. I did my best to avoid you but you ruthlessly come to me, smothering me with smiles. When the smile pentrates my heart I feel my nose and throat sticking. Then I welcome you again, push you away, and when my strength is spent I am dragged under and let myself be engulfed by you. Then just like a defeated soldier, stricken by fever, I pray for resurrection or abandon myself wishing that the present could be annihilated."

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South Korean workers resist U.S.-Japanese neo-colonialist exploitation

South Korea's industrial growth under the government of President Park Chung Hee has often led foreign observers to speak of it as "an economic miracle among the developing nations." However, with the increasing gap between rich and poor, it is unlikely that ordinary Koreans, upon whose labor this growth has been achieved, would term their economy a miracle. The most influential factor preventing Korean labor from sharing the benefits of the country's economic growth has been the strict control of unions and the Labor Office by a government restricting basic freedoms in the name of "Administrative Democracy."

Two years ago, a delegation of the San Francisco based International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union reported in the union paper (*Dispatcher,* October 9, 1970) their findings on their visit to South Korea.

The ILWU visitors found that South Korea did indeed have labor unions. ". . . All 16 of these unions (with 400,000 members) are controlled by the government-dominated (Federation of Korean Trade Unions) FKTU. They are in no position to change direction. They are subjugated by their own leaders.

". . . The labor unions are controlled by the government and big business. Labor officials are hired from outside the union ranks, based on the argument that the members are uneducated and unqualified for these positions.

"Also the military plays a heavy hand in the daily lives of the people. They are seen everywhere with billy clubs dangling from their belts."

These ILWU delegates saw Allan H. Krause of the political section of the U.S. Embassy. Krause frankly told them that "any employer in South Korea with less than 15 workers can pay any wages and schedule any amount of working hours without having to pay overtime."

In Seoul, the three toured an electronics plant called Signetics, that hires "only single girls between . . . 18 and 21." These young workers are fired when they marry. The manager of this U.S. factory termed Korean workers "very efficient."

Korean worker packs a heavy load.

"Interestingly," the three reported, "Signetics makes electronic components and conductors which are then shipped to the U.S. for as-

South Korean children.

sembly into TVs and radios and are even used in the space program."

This ILWU overseas report is closed off with a box containing the previously published labor comments by a South Korean Motorola plant manager who "boasted to newsmen recently that no union has succeeded in organizing (his) workers.

"We produce the same quality here at one-tenth the cost in the U.S.," he said. "And this includes the expense of bringing the parts from the U.S. and returning the finished product by air. I believe that these young girls are more motivated than U.S. workers and they are more disciplined, probably because they need the work."

How South Korean unionism works under U.S. occupation was explained to the three by a Reverend Ogle, apparently a missionary, who heads the U.S. "Mission to Labor and Industry." Reverend Ogle related an example:

". . . Years ago, the Salt Workers Union, which was very militant, voted to reject a substandard contract, even though the national union recommended it. The workers went on strike without help from the union—which was working against them anyhow. The government broke the union, broke the strike, and today there is no salt workers union at all."

Two recent incidents, the suicide of Chun

Tae-il in Seoul and the murder of Kim Jin-soo serve as impressive warnings against any independent attempts to organize unions.

Chun Tae-il, 23 years old, worked as a cutter in Seoul's Pyungwha Market, a large complex of small clothes-makers' shops. In letters and in his diary (see extracts in this issue) Chun vividly described the long working hours, as many as 14 a day, and the filthy, dust-ridden working conditions of the market's employees, mostly girls and women between the ages of 14 and 25. Chun tried to form a labor union. He was successful in organizing the "Association of Cloth Makers," consisting of some 60 fellow-workers from different shops within the market. His aim was to extend this union to the whole market but this task presented formidable difficulties. These included the vast differences in types of jobs, the wide age differences and the poor educational background of most workers. Chun's group tried to unite the diverse interests by means of demonstrations, the first of which was scheduled for early last November (1971). To the bitter disappointment of Chun, police suppressed the demonstration and tried to arrest the ringleaders. In despair, just outside Pyungwha Market, Chun Tae-il poured two tins of gasoline over his body and set himself on fire, in hope of influencing public opinion. He died a few hours later.

Chun quickly became a martyr for Pyungwha Market. Journalists and students from Seoul National University tried to publicize the case. Before his death Chun is alleged to have said, "Continue my spirit; use my sacrifice for organizing a labor union" and "Don't waste my death—many young people are overworked in the market." The Korean newspaper *Dong-A Ilbo* ran some excerpts of Chun's diary but when the original was returned to Chun's family, the pages on the organization of the union had been removed. Students were prevented by the police from organizing the dead man's funeral. A distinguished foreign lecturer at Seoul's Yonsei University who held a public lecture about Pyungwha Market and Chun's death was threatened with deportation by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.

As a result of the incident, some minor improvements were made by the official Labor Office in the market's physical working conditions.

The second labor dispute case was the murder of Kim Jin-soo, a young union supporter, working in the Han Young Textile Co. in Yongdeungpo, Seoul, this May. Last December the employees of the Han Young Co. organized as a sub-chapter of the National Textile Workers' Co-operative's Seoul chapter. This was op-



South Korean child and her home.

Children play on roof of rickety shack in which they live.

posed by the company's workshop manager who, in January, illegally dismissed the new sub-chapter's chairman and two other union leaders. The union called for the men's reinstatement. Yu Hae-poong, the manager, allegedly bribed two workers, Choi Hong-in and Hong Jin-ki, to menace union members into passing a motion branding the dismissed union leaders as "insurgents." A memo was discovered from Yu to the two workers in which Yu undertook to assume all legal responsibilities that might arise from their actions on his behalf.

On February 12 the union again demanded reinstatement of the three men and called for Yu to be brought before the Central Labor Council. The union then formally registered an official labor dispute. Yu is then alleged to have payed further funds to Choi Jin-hon, Hong Jin-ki and Choi Hong-in to organize an alternative union. On March 18 these three men, having

been drinking during working hours, assaulted Kim Jin-soo and several other workers. Later Kim was again repeatedly battered on the back of his head with a blunt instrument. Kim never recovered; he died on May 16. Despite appeals from students, the union and various Christian groups, no full-scale investigation was undertaken nor was Yu called upon to explain his role in the incident.

Two further labor protests in 1971 were of considerable interest in exposing different problems and tactics. Both struggles, in common with the Chun Tae-il and Kim Jin-soo protests, appear to have taken the Government by surprise.*

The first of these cases was important for exposing the collusion of the ROK government with the American military in South Vietnam. The origins of the struggle extend back some five years when 700 persons were employed by the Hanjin Transportation Company to work in South Vietnam under a contract the company had with the American forces. Hanjin attracted the 700 employees by offering a basic rate of US$390 per month plus overtime allowances. But once in South Vietnam, the workers discovered that no overtime was being paid and that anyone who complained about this was dismissed from work. Back in Korea, the workers determined to fight for their back wages. For a year they tried to place an advertisement explaining their predicament in the local newspapers. The press consistently refused to print the ad until, in January 1971, the weekly magazine *Chosun Ilbo* agreed to do so.

The workers claimed that back overtime pay averaged US$1,000 per person, totaling about US$4 million. When the company still didn't pay the claims, 700 workers attacked the head office of Hanjin in Seoul's new KAL building on September 12, 1971. Police immediately intervened, and 57 demonstrators were held for "questioning." Seventeen were later charged with "social unrest" and their cases are still pending before the courts.

The attack on the office aroused public opinion and concern. The opposition New Democratic Party demanded in the National Assembly that the president of Hanjin make public the details of the contract. The company refused on the surprising grounds that the contract was State Classified Military Information, a statement later upheld by the Government. The attempt to discover precisely how a private company could sign a contract in South Vietnam that becomes State Classified Military In-

* Both following cases were fairly fully reported in the local Korean press and the Kwangju incident was even picked up by some of the foreign correspondents. By contrast the Kim Jin-soo incident received little attention in the Korean press and none whatsoever abroad. Reporting of the Chun Tae-il case was forbidden by the government and care taken to avoid arousing the attention of the foreign press.

Women shipcleaners and scalers work aboard an American ship in port of Busan.

formation in Seoul, the public release of which could be detrimental to the security of the nation, is still being continued by the opposition in Seoul. In this instance, the protest of a group of workers had exposed much more serious problems, calling into question the Administration's total policy toward Vietnam.

Since the Korean War, the imbalance of wealth between the countryside and the newly industrialized cities of South Korea has attracted immigration to the urban areas at an alarming rate.* The poor rural workers accommodated themselves in the capital by building flimsy shacks from whatever materials happened to be at hand. In 1970 there were an estimated 180,000 such "shacks." As early as 1969, the government started to clear the illegal dwellings by forcing the inhabitants to move to a new "satellite" town, Kwangju, two hours from Seoul by bus.

By 1971 there were some 160,000 persons living in Kwangju, over 100,000 of whom had been moved from Seoul. But other than a luxurious town hall, little had been prepared for the new inhabitants: there was no water supply, no sewage system, no drainage, no electricity. Moreover, despite repeated promises of employment opportunities, by mid-1971, there were only 1,200 part-time jobs available for the 160,000 Kwangju residents. A Korean journalist visiting the town, vividly recalled, "As I left that wasteland of human civilization, a huge flag pole in the garden of the town hall loomed above me through the evening twilight like a cross at the gates of a neglected cemetery." According to the *Korea Times,* 15 children died of measles, diarrhea or fever in the month of July alone, while some 500 more were seriously ill from the same diseases, all due to insanitary living conditions.

In early August, the inhabitants rioted. Two police jeeps were burned and the police station and the estate office of the town hall were completely destroyed. The "sub-marginal people"—as the Establishment calls the inhabitants—were taking their revenge. The government was taken unaware and capitulated immediately. Administrative reforms were instituted; the price of land was lowered. Twenty-five hundred tons of rice and other grains were rushed to the impoverished citizens. Taxation was abolished in large part and employment centers set up.

Why did the government respond so readily and promptly? The first factor was the sheer size of the uprising—at least 20,000 persons participated. In light of this, Government attempts to dismiss the protest as led by a few extremist agitators (21 were arrested and charged with leading the uprising) seem rather hollow. Indeed, probably the most alarming feature for the government was the very spontaneity of the uprising. The entire Kwangju affair bore distinct similarities to the famed French Revolution's "Jacquerie." In a land where Kwangju is by no means the only underdeveloped town or village, there was a real fear that—like the "Jacquerie"—the Kwangju protest might spread throughout the Republic. At the time, such a possibility did not seem so remote. In any case, the government's measures succeeded in dampening the protest.*

These cases may well serve as a foretaste of incidents to come. Indeed, if the government is unwilling to ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits of modernization, rather than reserving their enjoyment to the select few, labor troubles could become much more widespread and serious. It is already clear in both the Chun Tae-il and the Kim Jin-soo cases, that student opposition movements—hitherto extremely exclusive in South Korea—have started to form some tentative contacts with some workers' movements. Although such cooperation is only in its very early stages, it could potentially create a powerful and articulate opposition outside the ordinary political power structure. It still remains to be seen whether the nascent alliance will survive the surveillance of the various police agencies.

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* The statistics for the growth of Seoul are as follows:

1945	900,000
1955	1,500,000
1965	3,500,000
1970	5,000,000

Thus the city's population has doubled since 1960. With an annual growth rate of 8%, Seoul is one of the world's fastest growing cities. See *Christians and Social Justice in Korea* by G. Breidenstein, Seoul, 1971.

* Fuller details can be found in the *Korea Times* and *Korea Herald* of December 8, 1972. The government estimated the number of rioters as 20,000 but other observers placed the number at nearly 50,000.

This article based on material by Ronin *editor D. Boggett published in* Ronin *No. 4 and* Rentar *(Japanese left student magazine) No. 3.*

South Korean student movement

THEY TOPPLED THE RHEE REGIME—
CAN PUPPET PARK CHUNG HEE ESCAPE THEIR WRATH NOW?

Following the collapse of President Syngman Rhee's government after widespread student demonstrations in 1960, Park Chung Hee took power by a military coup d'etat in 1961. The new government's first priority was re-establishing law, order and obedience while eliminating the source of its predecessor's difficulties.

The student movement has for a dozen years displayed many inherent weaknesses. (1) Students tended to consider themselves a special elite group. There were no planned attempts to coordinate with other opposition groups. The fact other citizens joined demonstrations was often regarded rather as a fortuitous chance happening. (2) There was little over-all coordination and many internal rivalries between the various Seoul universities. (3) After the fall of Rhee many students became disillusioned with John M. Chang's liberal government and its attempts to restore order and bring about the needed reforms. Many of the same students who had led the 1960 Revolution were later among the supporters of the 1961 military coup (though the alliance was, of course, short-lived). Coherent thought and agreement of aims and principles was conspicuously lacking among the 1960 students. (4) There has been a tendency since then for student leaders to dream of the glories of the 1960 Revolution, looking to the past rather than the future.

These weaknesses severely hampered the 1965 movement against normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan, and later the 1969 demonstrations against the constitutional amendment extending President Park's eligibility to a third term.

The demonstrations of late 1971 over which the army was summoned onto the University campuses, were the most serious student efforts since 1960. For the first time, attempt was made to overcome the earlier weaknesses. The first significant change in the direction of the student movement occurred towards the end of 1970 with the publication by a group of Seoul National University law students of an underground newspaper, *The Bell of Freedom* (Chayuui Jong), distributed throughout the Seoul University campuses. The publication served to coordinate student efforts, promote discussion and study groups on aspects of the student struggle and to break down traditional cross-campus rivalries. The newspaper thus marked a step forward in ideology, commitment and coordination without which the 1971 movement could hardly have been so effective. The chief discussion topics covered by the newspaper were the nature of Japanese investment in Korea, campus struggles and treatment of students imprisoned by the CIA or police. The paper continued publication for about one year until it was suppressed when the army occupied the campuses in October 1971 and its editor, Lee Shin Bom, arrested for "plotting to overthrow the legally constituted government of the Republic."

The same period saw considerable student involvement in labor disputes, a factor which could be of immeasurable importance in the future. "It has been proved beyond all doubt that the Government's claims about modernization and improvement of living conditions are false," argued one student over laborer Chun Tae-il's suicide protesting against working standards. A foreign lecturer at Yonsei University, Dr. G. Breidenstein, was threatened with deportation for holding a public lecture about the incident. Students circulated Chun Tae-il's diary, and appeals over trade unionist Kim Jin-soo's murder, in the streets of Seoul and were heavily involved in the funeral arrangements for both men. It was the first time that students had closely cooperated with other sections of the opposition.

Activities in 1971 centered around the Presidential and National Assembly elections in April and May. These pre-election demonstrations were considerably less haphazard than their forerunners. This was largely due to the formation of a cross-campus "National Student League" (sometimes referred to in Korean as

Zengakuren after the Japanese example) under the Presidency of Shim Chae-kwan, formerly of Seoul National University's law college. (Shim has also been arrested and faces the same charges as Lee Shin Bom.) The coordination achieved by the *Bell of Freedom* and the National Student League marked an important change in tactics for the student movement.

The protests initially focused on the government's proposal to extend campus military training. One of the student leaders explained privately, "Besides obviously lowering academic standards, campus military drill lessens the ability to think and criticize because military training requires a submissive and unquestioning loyalty to authority. The move would in fact delay the desired reunification of our country. We do not want unification by war, but by peace and negotiation. Moreover, the 'special merit' given to students engaging in military drill merely serves to widen the gap between a 'student elite' and the broad masses of the people. In short, the proposals are so clearly unnecessary that the real motives of the government are transparent—namely, to suppress campus activities, and to create a sense of imminent danger and crisis in the country at large so that the people, through fear, will accept a strong generalissimo-type government. The measures are not for 'national safety' at all, but only for the regime's continued security."

Chang Kee-Pyo and Lee Shin-Bom (right), former editor of Bell of Freedom, who were sentenced to five years for opposing the Park Chung Hee regime.

There were some arrests and sporadic confrontations between students and police throughout March and April and many students were suspended from college for evading the drill regulations. Still the movement seemed well under the authorities' control. Not until well after the May elections did cumulative dissatisfaction—over election procedures and results, the draft laws and sympathy for the students arrested or expelled—explode into the most serious demonstrations since 1960. The movement was sparked off by a seemingly trivial incident, which further emphasized how volatile the universities had become. Thirty armed soldiers of the Capitol Garrison Command entered the Korea University campus on the night of October 6. The soldiers later alleged that they had been incited by the students' talking of their commander in a "disrespectful manner." Twenty students were hauled away, beaten and then dumped in the home garden of Korea University's President. Thereafter students took to the streets throughout Seoul. The movement rapidly escalated and the government summoned troops into the city under the "Garrison Decree" to restore order.

The *Korea Times* described the troops' entry into the universities in its October 16 issue: "The troopers moved out of their camps in various parts of Seoul City at 10:35 a.m. and headed for Seoul National, Korea, Yonsei, and Sunggyungwan Universities. Paratroopers of the Army 1st Airborne Special Force Group were

South Korean students battle Seoul police in protest against the government.

also mobilized. Led by machinegun-mounted armored vehicles, the troopers stormed into the campuses aboard trucks. Riot police who accompanied the Army troops arrested students *who were holding rallies or hunger sit-ins on the campuses,* while the troops fired tear-gas bombs." (Our emphasis.)

The troopers succeeded in their objectives. Despite protests from National Assembly deputies and sympathetic professors or faculty members, the student movement was effectively crushed. Nevertheless, by resorting to the dispatch of the army into the campuses, the government had alienated large sections of public opinion, as shown by the unusually full coverage given to the events by the Korean press. Any possibility of cooperation in the National Assembly between the government party and the opposition had been ruled out.

After the lifting of the Garrison Decree, the following incidents were claimed in private interviews by students and journalists: "The soldiers put tear gas into a number of buildings at Korea University. There are even unconfirmed reports that a student was struck and severely injured by a tear gas cannister. Again at Korea University, virtually all male students present on the campus were hearded together by the police and forced to lie full length on the ground with their hands over their heads, clasped behind their necks. They were guarded in this position by soldiers with bayonets and loaded rifles.

"Students were taken by the truckload to the headquarters of the Capitol Garrison Command at the base of Namsan where they were

Police arrest student demonstrators.

beaten. These beatings were performed by long lines of soldiers, the first group of which kicked the students with their army boots as they passed down between the two rows of troops, the second group struck them with their fists and the third with their rifle butts.

"At Korea University a number of APCs (Armored Personnel Carriers) were used. Fire alarms were started in order to make the unsuspecting students emerge from their classes into the arms of the waiting police.

"At the Liberal Arts and Sciences college of Seoul National University two machine guns, loaded and with their belts of ammunition positioned ready on their bridges, were posted at the campus entrance. At Yonsei University there was a further machine gun in a sandbagged position. In the main campus of Seoul National University on the morning of the 16th there were at least a dozen huge military tents pitched and over thirty military vehicles parked on the school sports ground.

"The efforts of the press to report the situation were greatly hampered by the military. At Korea University, two Japanese photographers' films were taken from their cameras. An American photographer was chased down the street by soldiers after he took a photo of the University's main gate, at that time guarded by two armored personnel carriers."

Following the demonstrations, the government arrested several leaders under the National Security Law for "plotting to overthrow the legally constituted Government of the Republic." Four of those arrested were Chang Key-pyo, Cho Yong-nae, Shim Chae-kwon and Lee Shin Bom. Defending lawyers for Shim Chae-kwon and Lee Shin Bom claimed on November 30 that the students' confessions were "untrue and the result of severe torture." Those students most active in the labor movement, the publication of *Bell of Freedom* and coordination of cross-campus activities, were all arrested and received the most serious charges. Arrested later was former President of Seoul National University, Professor Yu Ki-chong, who was said to have incited students through his lectures. Before the presidential elections, Professor Yu stated, "I don't intend to teach law inside the campus when all vestiges of law are destroyed (by the police) right at the very campus gates themselves."

In the middle of the night of December 26, 1971, without the opposition attending (due to the Seoul curfew which starts at midnight), the government rammed through legislation to give it extra powers for a "National State of Emergency." Park was obviously troubled by opposition at home, and anticipated further difficulties from both the international currency realignment and Nixon's Asian policy shifts. The new law enabled the President to control prices, wages, rents and labor disputes; to alter budgetary appropriations; to mobilize people and resources throughout the nation at random to control public assemblies and demonstrations; to inspect and control the press. None of these actions would hereafter require National Assembly approval. It took only a one-minute committee session and a two-minute plenary session to pass the legislation. The powers granted are those usually reserved for governments engaged in full-scale war, not one which is sitting at a conference table with its old enemy supposedly to reunite divided families.

This article is based on material by D. J. Boggett, Ronin *Editor.*

Save the Soh Brothers

By RUTH C. NORRICK

A world-wide appeal for clemency has been mounted in Japan for two more of the countless political prisoners in South Korea. The two are brothers: Soh Sung who is 27, and Soh Joon Shik, 24. They are accused of spying for the North, an accusation both deny. Their trial and imprisonment have brought thousands of Japanese to their defense. In the Japanese Diet, 129 members are appealing for clemency to President Park Chung Hee. Amnesty International, with headquarters in London, has also joined the struggle.

Their "crime" also was to work for the reunification of their father's native land. They had themselves been born into the Korean community in Japan, which numbers 600,000. Some had come after the Japanese conquest of Korea in the early years of this century. Most had been impressed as laborers in the Second World War.

The hope of "returning" to Korea became the driving force in the life of the Soh brothers. The younger, after his graduation from high school in 1967, in Kyoto, went to study in his "homeland." The older followed in 1968. Both were studying at Seoul University, in the Faculty of Law, and the Graduate School of Sociology, respectively.

In April 1971, they were arrested by the Army Security Command of the Republic of Korea, charged with violating the national security and anti-communism laws. They were accused of having been in communication with

the DPRK, via Japan, and having planned to overthrow the government. And they were accused of organizing large student demonstrations against compulsory military training and in opposition to Park Chung Hee's continuance in office for a third term, in violation of the Constitution.

The prosecution relied on written "confessions." In their appeal, both young men maintained the "confessions" had been obtained by torture. The appearance of the elder brother lends credence to the charge. He has been burned over 45 percent of his body. His facial features are distorted. His glasses have to be held on by a string around his head. His hands were so badly burned that he had no fingerprints, so "certification" of his "confession" was obtained by a toe-print. The cause of the burns is unknown. Apart from emergency treatment in August 1971, more adequate treatment did not begin until January 1972.

On October 22, 1971, sentences were passed: death for the burned man, and 15 years imprisonment for his brother. The latter is in prison; the other in an Army hospital.

Fortunately they had friends in the Japanese community who, knowing them, refused to believe the charge and investigated. Only then did the horror of what had happened become known. Their intervention succeeded in getting hospital care for Sung, and the appeal for clemency was undertaken.

Urgency is given the effort, in the light of the government's execution last summer of Kim Kyu-Nam and Park No-Su, two Koreans who likewise had studied at Japanese universities, one later becoming a member of Parliament and the other an international law scholar. Their wish for peace between the divided countries of Korea led them into "violations" of the laws of the Republic of Korea, for which they were sentenced to death. Agitation on their behalf by their Japanese friends and supporters held off their execution for three years, giving hope that the men's lives would be spared. Expectations were further raised when the rapprochement between the south and the north was made known. But just at that time news of the executions was announced.

So the danger exists, despite the allaying news of the first steps towards reunification.

Readers are urged to write to the following: President Park Chung Hee, Seoul, Republic of Korea. Minister of Justice, Seoul, Republic of Korea. South Korean Ambassador to the USA, Sung Kwoo Kim, Korean Embassy, Washington, D.C. President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers, Washington, D.C.

Brothers Soh Joon-Shik, left, and Soh-Sung in Seoul court.

By ANGELO D'ANGELO

• According to a report from Seoul, Kim Yon Sam, national assemblyman from the opposition New Democratic Party of South Korea, expressed his wish to go to Pyongyang and meet Premier Kim Il Sung to consult with him about the question of reunification.

Expressing his discontent with the attitude of the south Korean government which does not allow representatives to visit Pyongyang, Kim Yong Sam said that "the discussion of reunification must not be a possession of the specified persons of the ruling party or the government.

He maintained that "it is desirable to open the road of dialogue for opposition political leaders" at least.

Earlier in the year this opposition national assemblyman in an interview with a Japanese newsman in Seoul called for opening the road of contacts and dialogue between the north and the south. Saying that he is ready to visit Pyongyang anytime, he declared: "I decided to take part myself and not leave the question of reunification to the Park regime alone."

• Two hundred thirty-eight Koreans left the Japan Seaport of Niigata recently for Chongjin, North Korea, aboard a repatriation ship chartered by the Pyongyang government.

The 3,573-ton Man Kyung Bong was the third repatriation ship sent by North Korea for the continued repatriation of Korean residents from Japan since the Red Cross repatriation agreement between the two countries expired last October.

Officials said a total 90,432 Koreans have been repatriated to North Korea since December 1959, when repatriation began under the previous agreement.

• Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General, in his first annual report to the U.N. General Assembly, August 13, said the recent Korean development "may mean admission of those divided countries to the U.N. in the next year or two."

• Reports from South Korea indicate a growing gap between rich and poor with about 22 percent of the urban people living without meals twice a week. According to these figures, 37 percent take only one meal a day. As in most cases, it is the unemployed who are suffering the most, with over 470,000 homeless from the recent flood disasters.

Meanwhile, the 7,700,000 unemployed workers stand in sharp contrast to the living conditions of those few Koreans who are wealthy enough to live in the exclusive areas of Tongbinggo-dong and Ryongsan-gu, Seoul.

• The upsurge of worker unrest throughout South Korea has reached new proportions, according to news reports emitting from Seoul.

Workers at the woolen textile company in Yongdungpo held a mass sit-down strike on August 9 and 10 in their demand for union recognition. On September 3 more than 500 workers took part in another sit-down at the same factory.

In the province of South Cholla, about 200 peasants staged a demonstration on August 10 and 11 to protest the devastation of their farmland to make way for a military highway to the southern coast. The peasants were demanding that Seoul immediately stop the construction of the project which was inundating their farms.

In mid-June this year about 60,000 workers took part in a strike at the Hung-han Chemical Co. in Kyonggi Province over the issue of back pay.

More than 1,700 dockers in Inchon went on strike in demand of a 58 percent wage hike, and workers in a telegraphic service and metal industry waged a struggle calling for payment of wages which has been in arrears for two years. Over 3,000 dockers in Inchon had fought for collective bargaining rights.

In spite of the Seoul government's "state of emergency" on labor unrest, it seems that South Korean workers are determined to struggle for trade union recognition.

• The Department of Commerce said the Russian exports to North Korea increased by more than 50% in 1971 over 1970 "reflecting renewed Soviet aid deliveries as relations with North Korea have also improved."

The announcement showed that the Russian-North Korean trade was three times bigger than the Russia-China trade, and twice as large as the Russian-Mongolia trade.

The announcement was contained in the "U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relationships In A New Era," dated August, 1972.

According to the announcement, the Russian exports to and imports from North Korea steadily rose from $178 million in 1966 to $503 million in 1971.

In the 1966-71 period, the Russian exports to North Korea were; $86 million, $110 million, $172 million, $202 million, $230 million and $367 million.

In the same period, the Russian imports from North Korea were; $92 million, $108 million, $121 million,

• Representatives of six major Japanese steel companies, including Nippon Steel Corporation and other trading firms, recently went to Pyongyang to discuss steel exports to North Korea.

Their departure left one question unanswered in Japan's trade relations with the North Koreans. The Japanese Government does not recognize North Korea and has not permitted Japanese firms to trade with North Korea on a deferred payment basis.

Atsuji Ohashi, a Nippon Steel executive who led the group of representatives, said earlier the group would visit North Korea after a Japanese Government approval for financing steel exports to the socialist nation on a deferred payment basis had been obtained.

The five other companies represented in Ohashi's group were Nippon Kokan Co., Sumitomo Metal Industries Co., Kawasaki Steel Co., and Sumitomo Shoji Co.

• In its attempts to attract foreign investors, the Seoul regime has proudly stated that one of South Korea's finest assets is "low labor costs." South Korean workers are the lowest paid in all of Asia, working under some of the worst conditions in the world and competing with a semi and hardcore army of about 8 million unemployed.

General Motors Corporation is but one of many U.S. conglomerates that has taken advantage of South Korea's "cheap labor." G.M. has begun producing the Chevrolet 1700, a lower-medium size car with an engine displacement of 1700 cc. G.M. hopes to supplement their production with the Rekord, a car a little larger than the Chevrolet 1700 and already in production in West Germany.

Although labor costs are much lower in South Korea, G.M. is selling their Chevrolet 1700 for about $4,500 here in the states. While Americans are paying more for the car and Korean workers are receiving less for their labor, G.M.'s profit margin is steadily rising. At present G.M. is producing the Chevrolet 1700 with about 60 percent of the parts coming from G.M. subsidiaries in West Germany and Australia and about 40 percent of the components made by the General Motors Korea Company.

General Motors Korea Company, a creation of G.M. and the Shinjin Motor Company, is extending its horizons by building an engine plant at Bupyong (where the Chevrolet 1700 is assembled) and a foundry in Inchon.

The G.M. conglomerate also has hopes of constructing a body plant in South Korea by 1976.

One wonders how bright the job future is for American auto workers and their families.

• The U.S. military command, according to reports from Korea, withdrew U.S. MP's from Panmunjom to leave the area to the Koreans themselves. Now we ask, isn't it time for the U.S. to withdraw from all parts of South Korea?

• According to a World Bank Study, June 1972, Seoul proper had a population in 1970 of 4,661,000 people, registering an annual growth rate of 8% from 1960-1970. In the same period the national urbanization growth of all of South Korea was at the annual rate of 4.1%. South Korea's urban population rose from 28% of the national population in 1960 to 39% in 1970.

• According to World Bank Statistics on Korea, released in the Spring 1972 issue of FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, a publication of the INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND & WORLD BANK GROUP, the mid-1969 population of South Korea was 31,139,000, the average annual population growth rate (1960-1969) was 2.6%, and the per capita Gross National Product, in 1969, was $210.

Their estimate for the Democratic Peoples' Republic for the same period were 13,300,000 population, average annual population growth rate was 2.6%, and the per capita Gross National Product was $280.

• Several more students were sentenced to harsh labor recently when Seoul authorities held a trial session at the Seoul High Court of Justice on September 11, 1972 and sentenced Li Sin Bom, Cho Yong Rae and two other students of Seoul University to penal servitude up to two years' imprisonment on charges of "attempting a rebellion and plotting to use explosives."

The arrested students were involved in activities for campus freedom and the democratization of society.

• At a time when hostilities seemed to be decreasing on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. has decided to beef up surveillance of the North-South Korean border.

The Defense Monitor, published by the Center for Defense Information, has uncovered U.S. plans to spend $1 million in the current fiscal year for "border surveillance" in Korea.

• The Congressional committee on conference has approved a military construction bill that authorizes $2,018,000 to be spent by the U.S. Army in South Korea for construction at "various locations."

• World War II military secrets are being declassified by the National Archives in Washington, D.C., according to the Wall Street Journal, September 6, 1972. The government is using 100 highly trained employees but not a single one of them would be allowed to process the Defense Department papers on U.S. intervention in the Korean War. With the apparent thaw in inter-Korean relations, one can only wonder why the Defense Department is dragging its feet on exposing the truth about the Korean War.

• The U.S. House of Representatives recently defeated a House Internal Security Committee bill that would have permitted the President to deny any American the right to travel to the DPRK if he wished.

• On September 8, 1972 the Seoul government closed down the Seoul bureau of *Yominuri Shimbun* (Japan's third largest daily newspaper with a circulation of 9 million—5.5 million for the morning edition and 3.5 million for the evening edition) and order its chief Nobuo Kato to leave the country by September 11.

This is the first time a foreign news office has been closed in South Korea and a foreign news-

man has been ordered to leave.

The forcible closure of the Seoul office of *Yomiuri Shimbun* by the South Korean authorities, in essence, does not seem to be a mere attack on the press and the freedom of speech. Obviously, they intend to bring pressure to bear upon Japanese public opinion.

The weekly *Yomiuri* published by *Yomiuri Shimbun* had brought out recently a special issue on the DPRK numbering 145 pages.

The special issue had carried a portrait of Premier Kim Il Sung on its front page.

The South Korean authorities closed the Seoul office of *Yomiuri Shimbun* on charges that it had widely introduced and lauded the development of the northern half of the DPRK and "insulted" South Korea.

• Marksman Li Ho Jun of the DPRK was the first Korean player in the Olympics to win a gold medal, setting an Olympic and World record in small bore rifle shooting.

The marksman, Li Hon Jun, scored a total of 599 out of 600. The Soviet newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* praising the remarkable success of marksman Li Ho Jun said, "this first gold medal for the DPRK might have not been the first because it is only the first time the DPRK has participated in the summer Olympics." Western news agencies stated, "The DPRK carried away the Olympic gold which had been firmly believed would go to the U.S."

• DPRK athletes also took the following additional medals: Kim Gwan Hyon took the bronze medal in free style wrestling, defeating the Mexican, Hungarian, Turkish and Canadian competitors; the DPRK men's gymnastic team came in sixth with 545.05 points; Pak Dong Gun came in 6th in the 52 kg weight lifting event; Kim Yong Ui won the bronze medal in the 63 kg judo tournament by beating the GDR, Hungarian, and Cuban competitors. North Koreans ranked 22nd in medal standing, South Korea, 38th.

O Hyon Ju, Chairman of the Olympic Committee of the DPRK, and Kim Taek Su, Chairman of the South Korean Olympic Committee staying in Munich for the 20th summer Olympic games, visited each other and exchanged views on the question of interchange in sports between the north and the south, according to reports from Munich.

On September 8, the two sides reached an agreement on inviting the other side respectively to Pyongyang and Seoul for talks on the question of interchange in sports between the North and the South.

• Japan's trade with the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea is almost certain to more than double the figure for last year (1971), reaching 100 million dollars, according to the Japan Korea Trade Association in Tokyo. In 1970 the two way trade volume amounted to about 57.5 million dollars. Tokyo is expected to make its Export Import Bank available to the Trade Bank in Pyongyang.

The Association of Japanese Trading Industrialists forecast a bright future because of the remarkable increase in Japan's commerce with North Korea during the first four months of 1972 and the additional trade deals pending.

Japan seems to be concentrating its investment on South Korea's so-called "strategic industries"—cement (related to new construction or expansion of airfields, ports, roads, bridges, etc.), fertilizer (directly linked with gunpowder production, refining and power industries, traffic and transport, etc.)

The sum now accounts for over 80 per cent of their total investment in South Korea.

On February 15, 1968, the Japanese corporation Iwai Sangyo decided to make investments totalling 2.6 million dollars to South Korean "Shinchang Sanop," a native capitalist, to build a factory manufacturing rifles, light machineguns and ammunition.

Japanese Toyota Auto reached a decision to invest 2.8 million dollars in the South Korean company Sinjin Auto Co. Ltd. to engage exclusively in manufacturing and repairing vehicles.

In this connection a South Korean publication wrote: "Automobile factories can produce armoured cars or tanks if they have more equipment installed for tractor production." ("Business," No. 8, 1968.)

The Japanese monopoly capitalists sell to South Korea large quantities of weapons, machines for their production, gunpowder and vehicles fit for use in the construction of military highway, etc.

The Japanese militarists exported there 1,500 military vehicles from 1964 to 1967, nearly 3,000 from 1967 to early 1968.

The import from Japan of machines for production of weapons in 1968 showed an increase worth 24 million dollars as against in 1967.

Recently, Japanese corporations have sharply increased direct investment to hold stocks for control of factories.

The data released by the "Bank of Korea" show that the total direct investment by Japan ran into 48.67 million dollars, that is, 34.7 per cent of all the foreign capital directly invested, as of the end of 1969.

The ratio of stock-holding by the direct investors are as follows: those who hold less than 50 per cent of the stocks of the enterprise concerned account for 19 per cent; those holding 50 per cent of the stocks, 33 per cent; those holding 50 to 99 per cent, 22 per cent; those holding 100 per cent, 26 per cent. (*Chungang Ilbo,* April 9, 1970.)

In other words, 80 per cent of the direct investors hold more than 50 per cent of total stocks.

In this way Japanese business keeps native South Korean enterprises under control.

• There seems to be a great deal of haggling between the paymaster (Pentagon) and the client (South Korean Generals) on whether the South Korean mercenaries in South Vietnam who will have to vacate their cozy nests following a peace agreement are to come home with the U.S. provided weapons. The clients would like to take it home with them just in case of an emergency to be used against the South Korean people, the paymaster wants to leave it behind with the Thieu gangster regime to be used in the slaughter of Thieu's opponents.

Denis Newell Pritt, Q.C., 1887-1972

The American-Korean Friendship and Information Center joins in the world-wide tribute to the memory, and the work, of D. N. Pritt. He was a great and good man. He died at his home, near London, last May, at work to the very end.

He was mankind's advocate. His autobiography has the record of his involvement in many of the history-making legal battles of our time: notably, the trial of Georgi Dimitrov in the Nazi courts in 1933, and the defense, successively, of three Africans who later became chiefs-of-state of their newly independent countries, Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya, Julius K. Nyerere from Tanzania, and Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana.

Not the least of his efforts was the work he did—known abroad if not in the United States—in exposing the lie about the start of the Korean War. He expressed his gratification, when long years later, the AKFIC undertook to bring out that truth, in a demand that the United Nations end its involvement, and that the United States withdraw from South Korea. He was a contributor to the first issue of *Korea Focus.*

He lived long enough to see that great shift in the balance of world forces now taking place. He had seen the socialist world come into being in 1917; he had fought in defense of that world wherever it was challenged. He had seen it grow in strength until it could stand up to the "malevolence of the capitalist world," to quote his own words. He used his skills, as a lawyer and public advocate, to bring about that change.

DENIS NEWELL PRITT, Q.C.
1887-1972

Smith Act Defendant Robert Klonsky

In '46 He Warned of Danger of Korea War

By BERNARD BURTON

BACK in 1946, when many Americans had never even heard of Korea and most could not tell you where it was, a young man, still in U. S. Army uniform, was trying to warn his countrymen of the danger that lurked in the "land of morning calm." But the soldier was only an honorably discharged private first class and who was there to take his word that the generals were following a policy in Korea that was imperilling the peace and the security of the United States?

His story did break through once, on his way back from occupation duty in Korea, when the Los Angeles Daily News" interviewed him and reported his warning good position to know the truth about Korea back there in 1946. His army assignment had given him more than a foxhole view and that's why he made interesting copy for the "Los Angeles Daily News." He had been transferred to occupation duty in Korea after having fought in a flame-throwing tank battalion in Okinawa. Within a short time he received orders to take over as editor of the "Korea Graphic," army newspaper for the occupation forces.

"How did you happen to get assigned as editor of the paper?" I asked Bob Klonsky.

Klonsky, a slender, thoughtful man who gives an impression of someone who cannot be shaken from a just course by threat or blandishment, smiled: "I'd been a

Vets say U. S. backs collaborators, feudal groups to rule over Koreans

This is the last of three analytical articles on the subject of little known, explosive Korea. The tiny peninsula is already a test tube for postwar readjustment policies, may soon find itself in the lap of the UN.

By VERN PARTLOW

Two hopping mad veterans just off the boat have tossed a political bomb into the Korean colony here that may have its final explosion before the UN.

The bombardiers, ex-Pfc. Robert Klonsky and ex-S/St. Harold Zapolin, of New York and Denver, respectively, told local Koreans bluntly that the American military government is kicking democracy around in their homeland.

Both veterans of the occupation of the southern half of the liberated peninsula —Russia occupies the northern part—the ex-GIs declared Uncle Sam actually is playing ball with fuedal groups and former Jap collaborators.

Klonsky, who served as editor of the Korea Graphic, army newspaper for the occupation forces, and Zapolin, an army clerk, dis-

Page of the Sunday Worker of November 28, 1953 displays story of Robert Klonsky.

27 Years Ago

A United States Soldier in South Korea

By ROBERT KLONSKY

Reports of initial negotiations between the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, led by Kim Il Sung, and the Park Chung Hee administration in South Korea, regarding the possibilities for reunification of the Korean nation, is of enormous significance to anti-imperialist, national liberation, all democratic and peace forces throughout the world.

Regardless of any subsequent problems or difficulties that may arise, the beginnings of even these limited discussions is additional confirmation that the desire for national independence; for self-determination; for complete freedom from the domination of U.S. imperial-

Robert Klonsky was with the 713th Tank Battalion on Okinawa at the conclusion of World War II. He was shipped to Korea as part of the U.S. occupation force and served there as editor of Korea Graphic, *Army newspaper for the occupation forces. Earlier, Klonsky had fought in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade during the war against fascism in Spain.*

ism, simply cannot be suppressed or destroyed in South Korea even after 27 years of terror, torture, mass murder, massive bribery and corruption, or outright military aggression.

How great indeed must be the pressures and demands from the masses of Korean workers and peasants—the entire people of South Korea, including sections of the national bourgeoisie, that even the U.S. hand-picked puppets of the Park Chung Hee government must bend and bow to this demand if they are to retain, even temporarily, any degree of credibility or influence.

This is all the more remarkable when one goes back over those 27 years, even in the limited fashion possible, to reflect on the crushing obstacles placed in the path of Korean freedom by U.S. imperialism.

One must go back to August, 1945, to the end of World War II and the defeat of Japanese imperialism. In mid-September of that year, I arrived in Seoul, Korea with my unit, the 713th Tank Battalion from Okinawa, one week after the first American troops landed.

Shortly thereafter, I received a most welcome reassignment to the job of Editor of the *Korea Graphic,* army newspaper published by the XXIV Corps, I & E, part of the 5th Army, commanded by Gen. Hodge.

With my editorial offices quartered in the Hanto Hotel, which also served as Gen. Hodge's Headquarters—the center of all activity for U.S. occupation forces—I found myself in a most advantageous position to learn, to observe the political developments—from scratch, so to speak. I had my own press pass, an available jeep and consequently spent time and traveled with members of the foreign press corps.

Immediately following the defeat of Japan, the Korean people and their organizations assumed authority over their land. Over 40 years of foreign occupation had come to an end. They formed a network of People's Committees. Even before U.S. troops arrived they were busy disarming Japanese troops, establishing security and protection committees which occupied and protected former Japanese-owned factories, warehouses and other facilities. (After all, were these not to become the rightful property of the Korean people?) They took over the administration of the press and radio, called meetings of the people, etc.

As a matter of fact, my sharpest impressions and memories of those first days and weeks in South Korea—in and around Seoul—was the feeling and awareness of massive and intensive organizing efforts by the Korean people. The Korean peasants (So. Korea was and is predominantly agrarian) formed their Federation. Student and faculty committees appeared at the schools and colleges. During my first 10 to 12 weeks there, I met with leaders of the All-Korean Federation of Women, who subsequently gave me a long, handwritten scroll, containing an appeal to the women of the U.S. for aid in the struggle against the intensifying U.S. repression.

I can recall invigorating discussions with groups of artists and writers, Communist and non-Communist, who in addition to displaying a remarkable awareness of artistic and literary developments in the U.S., (we discussed the works of Hemingway, Dreiser, Steinbeck, etc.) described the efforts already under way to mobilize the cultural workers for their role in a liberated, united Korea.

All of the revolutionary, democratic popular upsurge of activity, organization—the exuberance and enthusiasm which I observed during those first weeks—was soon to be smashed.

While in the North, the Soviet Armed Forces were preparing to turn over all authority to the Korean Liberation forces, having fully recognized the Peoples Committees, in the South by the end of 1945, the organizations of the people were suppressed and driven back into the illegal or semi-legal, underground status in which they had been operating under Japanese rule. With the Peoples Committees declared illegal, the U.S. created the so-called Representative Democratic Council, under newly-imported Syngman Rhee—a Council which was neither representative nor democratic.

Within the weeks and months to follow, I nevertheless found it possible to maintain contact with the leaders of these same organizations: trade unionists, peasants, women leaders, youth and students, writers, artists and academics.

(Eyewitness item—from old notes—October, '45)

Some 30-odd Korean students, recently repatriated from Japan, had formed an Association of their own—living together and pledged to devote their lives to Korean freedom and independence. I'm awakened one night by an American newspaper correspondent. "Let's go, Bob, something big is happening." Drove our jeep the few blocks to the student's house.

Using the phoney charge that the students were secretly storing weapons, Syngman Rhee's police, supported by U.S. M.P.'s raided the building. We watched them carry out 21 bodies. The only weapon found was one *Japanese Samurai sword!*

Within the first 4 months of U.S. occupation of So. Korea, my notes indicate, more than 500 Korean trade unionists had been jailed either by the U.S. military occupation forces directly or by Rhee's growing police forces.

(Eyewitness item—from old notes—November, '45)

Student leader arrested by secret police. Joined with two other U.S. newsmen to witness interrogation. When we arrive, Rhee's agents bow and scrape to welcome us. After all, aren't we their "allies" in their anti-communist crusade? The student to be interrogated is on his knees with his wrists tied behind his back and further tied to his ankles. His stubbornness in refusing to answer questions is punished by blows across his back. We leave before it's over, unable to either stop it or stomach it.

In December, '45, a story reaches us that arrangements had been made to receive a shipload of oranges from Japan, in exchange for a shipload of rice which had already been sent there. The oranges were scheduled for free distribution to the people of So. Korea. The shipload of oranges disappears, only to reappear on the black market several weeks later. To attempt to silence the people's indignation and anger, and after much agitation and demands, a peasant spokesman is granted the right to raise the matter of the missing oranges on the government radio.

We all gather at the radio station the night of the scheduled broadcast. The press representatives and others are in the corridors of the radio station, watching him as he begins his broadcast. No sound comes over the amplifiers in the corridors. He's talking to a dead mike. He doesn't realize it until his entire speech is concluded—a speech in which he has accused the Rhee government of responsibility for black-marketing the oranges. He stomps out of the radio station with his colleagues, in anger. Leaving through the rear exit, he walks into an ambush—grenades are thrown at him and he is killed—others are wounded by grenade shrapnel. Some of us just miss being similarly hit.

These are merely samples of dozens of similar incidents which I personally witnessed during some 8 months in Seoul, Korea. Repeated efforts on the part of correspondents to get some of these incidents wired back to their papers, were stymied. Many of these incidents were described in letters sent back to the U.S. by mail, enclosed in envelopes of other G.I's, since my own mail by then was carefully watched.

A dramatic example of our efforts to get the information out of the country at that time, concerned the late and respected writer Edgar Snow. In early '46, Snow arrived in Seoul. He was then working as Associate Editor of the *Saturday Evening Post.* He came to see me one day, indicating that he had learned of my contact with certain individuals he was anxious to speak with. Would I help arrange a get-together. My fear and nervousness over the possibility that my relationships were becoming too widely known and represented a threat to the safety of my Korean friends, was momentarily overcome by my enthusiasm for the idea of a man of Snow's stature getting some of the truth published back home, regarding the terrible role being played by our government and army.

It took special care and additional time, but the meeting was arranged. My Korean friends knew of Edgar Snow. They greeted the planned meeting with enthusiasm.

Snow did not assume the role of "objective"

reporter. He was shocked and indignant at the stories and reports presented to him that night. He promised to present the facts in the *Saturday Evening Post.* Months later, after my discharge from the Army and my return home, I secured the magazine's issue containing Snow's article. Alas! It was a highly watered down, brutally edited version of what I had heard being told to him in that session months before. I can only believe that it was not Edgar Snow's doing, but that of his superiors in the editorial offices of the *Saturday Evening Post.*

To this day, there are only a very few, selected correspondents who even attempt to tell the true story of the U.S. role in Korea. In early March of 1946, some two months before I was actually scheduled for shipment home, I was given my orders, escorted by two armed M.P.'s to the ship, placed on board on my way home. Before leaving the port, I was questioned for one hour or so by two officers from the Army's C.I.D. and warned not to try to jump ship and return to Korea, or I would be court-martialed. The thought obviously never entered my mind. I was glad to be going home.

The pattern of massive repression of those early days was to continue and grow worse as the subsequent years went by. A few excerpts from the press . . . clippings I have collected over the years:

1948: "The 'water treatment' is commonly given by trussing the prisoner and hanging him by his heels. Teapots of water are then poured in his nostrils." (*United Nations World,* May 1948, article by Younghill Kang)

1949: ". . . . 89,000 people had been arrested between Sept. 4, 1948 and April 3, 1949." (Report of U.N. Commission in Korea)

1950: "Large sections of South Korea are darkened today by a cloud of terror that is probably unparalleled in the world." (*The New York Times,* March 6, 1950, article by Walter Sullivan)

1951: *The New York Times,* April 11, 1951, headline: VILLAGE MASSACRE STIRS SOUTH KOREA—ATROCITY BY SOUTH KOREAN POLICE

1952: "The 64,000 state police (organized by U.S. Advisors—my insert, R. K.) have unlimited power of arrest, detention and torture, and they use that power promiscuously. It is common for these so-called guardians of the law to give arrested persons a severe beating before questioning them, just to put them in a receptive frame of mind. . . .

"We have under our protection a system with much resemblance to Nazism. The Korean police share many traits of the Gestapo. The Korean Youth Corps is often an adjunct to the police . . .

"Cases have been reported . . . where people who applauded a critic of Rhee at a public meeting were afterward taken into custody . . .

"Almost universal graft among small officials . . . But it is the big racketeers who prey on their oppressed countrymen with the greatest brutality.

"The harshness of police corruption is striking. If a farmer protests when the policeman seizes part of his food, he is liable to be sent to prison as a Communist, or be dispatched to the labor units at the front line." (*Sun-Times,* December 27, 1952, from a series of articles by veteran correspondent Frederick Kuh)

Similar reports covering the subsequent years to the present, can be detailed ad nauseam. But they can only skim the surface. Perhaps someday soon, some courageous individual will supply the American people with a new set of Pentagon Papers exposing official U.S. policy in Korea.

But even more crucial is the need to join the demand that the U.S. get out of Viet Nam, with the equally just demand that the U.S. remove its destructive, repressive and exploitative presence, totally, from South Korea.

Let the South Korean people, who have withstood 27 years of the evils of U.S. imperialism, including a devastating war, be free to join with their North Korean sisters and brothers in building a free, prosperous, independent and unified Korea—with power in the hands of the people. My own experience with the Korean people tells me that they not only desire that goal, but that they know how to get there.

Now is the time for trial of U.S. war criminals

NEVER FORGET . . . . . .

Portrait of a war criminal who will be remembered as a worthy student pupil of Adolph Hitler.

The picture on the back cover of this issue is not a painting by Goya portraying the murder of defenseless Spaniards by Napoleon's invading army.

Nor is it a picture of fascist atrocities committed by the Hitler-Mussolini-Tojo goons in occupied countries during the Second World War.

NO.

The back cover picture is a "USA-PENTAGON MADE PRODUCT."

This is a photo taken by a GI of the My Lai massacre, March 1968.

Three hundred forty-seven Vietnamese civilians, old men, women and children were slaughtered by orders of the commander-in-chief, Lyndon Baines Johnson, General Westmoreland and the Pentagon architects of wanton murder and destruction. Murdered by the commissioned officers who organized, directed and forced GIs under threat of war-time court-martial to participate in the execution of the high command orders under the slogan of "search and destroy."

The present commander-in-chief, Richard M. Nixon, has for four years ordered and inspired hundreds of My Lais and thousands of airborne acts of terrorism against populated centers in Vietnam including schools, churches, hospitals, playgrounds, dwellings, busy thoroughfares, business, government and work institutions, bridges and dikes.

Such acts of terrorism were carried through against diplomats of foreign countries residing in Vietnam causing the terroristic murder of the French diplomat in Hanoi.

These My Lai trails wind their way to the White House, the Pentagon, the Military Industrial Complex, the unconscionable profit-hungry manufacturers of napalm. On these streams of warm, oozing, not yet fully congealed human blood of little babies there is inscribed in letters of fire an indictment, a cry to mankind, a plea to the people of the USA—

. . . NEVER FORGIVE THESE WAR CRIMINALS!

Is this the 'Peace with Honor' of which THE WAR CRIMINAL speaks?